93 lines
3.5 KiB
ReStructuredText
93 lines
3.5 KiB
ReStructuredText
Security
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========
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We take the security of ``cryptography`` seriously. The following are a set of
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policies we have adopted to ensure that security issues are addressed in a
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timely fashion.
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Infrastructure
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--------------
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In addition to ``cryptography``'s code, we're also concerned with the security
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of the infrastructure we run (primarily ``cryptography.io``). If you discover
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a security vulnerability in our infrastructure, we ask you to report it using
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the same procedure.
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What is a security issue?
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-------------------------
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Anytime it's possible to write code using ``cryptography``'s public API which
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does not provide the guarantees that a reasonable developer would expect it to
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based on our documentation.
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That's a bit academic, but basically it means the scope of what we consider a
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vulnerability is broad, and we do not require a proof of concept or even a
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specific exploit, merely a reasonable threat model under which ``cryptography``
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could be attacked.
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To give a few examples of things we would consider security issues:
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* If a recipe, such as Fernet, made it easy for a user to bypass
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confidentiality or integrity with the public API (e.g. if the API let a user
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reuse nonces).
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* If, under any circumstances, we used a CSPRNG which wasn't fork-safe.
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* If ``cryptography`` used an API in an underlying C library and failed to
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handle error conditions safely.
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Examples of things we wouldn't consider security issues:
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* Offering ECB mode for symmetric encryption in the *Hazmat* layer. Though ECB
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is critically weak, it is documented as being weak in our documentation.
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* Using a variable time comparison somewhere, if it's not possible to
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articulate any particular program in which this would result in problematic
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information disclosure.
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In general, if you're unsure, we request that you to default to treating things
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as security issues and handling them sensitively, the worst thing that can
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happen is that we'll ask you to file a public issue.
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Reporting a security issue
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--------------------------
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We ask that you do not report security issues to our normal GitHub issue
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tracker.
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If you believe you've identified a security issue with ``cryptography``, please
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report it to ``alex.gaynor@gmail.com`` and/or ``paul.l.kehrer@gmail.com``. You
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should verify that your MTA uses TLS to ensure the confidentiality of your
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message.
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Once you've submitted an issue via email, you should receive an acknowledgment
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within 48 hours, and depending on the action to be taken, you may receive
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further follow-up emails.
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Supported Versions
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------------------
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At any given time, we will provide security support for the `master`_ branch
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as well as the most recent release.
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New releases for OpenSSL updates
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--------------------------------
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As of versions 0.5, 1.0.1, and 2.0.0, ``cryptography`` statically links OpenSSL
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in binary distributions for Windows, macOS, and Linux respectively, to ease
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installation. Due to this, ``cryptography`` will release a new version whenever
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OpenSSL has a security or bug fix release to avoid shipping insecure software.
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Like all our other releases, this will be announced on the mailing list and we
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strongly recommend that you upgrade as soon as possible.
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Disclosure Process
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------------------
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When we become aware of a security bug in ``cryptography``, we will endeavor to
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fix it and issue a release as quickly as possible. We will generally issue a new
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release for any security issue.
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The steps for issuing a security release are described in our
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:doc:`/doing-a-release` documentation.
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.. _`master`: https://github.com/pyca/cryptography
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