232 lines
		
	
	
		
			5.8 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			232 lines
		
	
	
		
			5.8 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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| /*
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|  * Copyright (c) 2019 FUJITSU LIMITED. All rights reserved.
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|  * Author: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
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|  *
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|  * Test PR_GET_SECCOMP and PR_SET_SECCOMP of prctl(2).
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|  * 1) If PR_SET_SECCOMP sets the SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT for the calling thread,
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|  *    the only system call that the thread is permitted to make are read(2),
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|  *    write(2),_exit(2)(but not exit_group(2)), and sigreturn(2).  Other
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|  *    system calls result in the delivery of a SIGKILL signal. This operation
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|  *    is available only if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled.
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|  * 2) If PR_SET_SECCOMP sets the SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER for the calling thread,
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|  *    the system calls allowed are defined by a pointer to a Berkeley Packet
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|  *    Filter. Other system calls result int the delivery of a SIGSYS signal
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|  *    with SECCOMP_RET_KILL. The SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation is available
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|  *    only if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER enabled.
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|  * 3) If SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER filters permit fork(2), then the seccomp mode
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|  *    is inherited by children created by fork(2).
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <errno.h>
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| #include <signal.h>
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| #include <sys/prctl.h>
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| #include <sys/wait.h>
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| #include <sys/types.h>
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| #include <linux/filter.h>
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| #include <unistd.h>
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| #include <stdlib.h>
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| #include <stddef.h>
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| #include "tst_test.h"
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| #include "lapi/syscalls.h"
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| #include "lapi/prctl.h"
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| #include "config.h"
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| #include "lapi/seccomp.h"
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| 
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| #define FNAME "filename"
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| 
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| static const struct sock_filter  strict_filter[] = {
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| 	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, (offsetof (struct seccomp_data, nr))),
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| 
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| 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ, __NR_close, 5, 0),
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| 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ, __NR_exit,  4, 0),
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| 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ, __NR_wait4, 3, 0),
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| 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ, __NR_write, 2, 0),
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| 	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ, __NR_clone, 1, 0),
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| 
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| 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL),
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| 	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
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| };
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| 
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| static const struct sock_fprog  strict = {
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| 	.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(strict_filter),
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| 	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)strict_filter
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| };
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| 
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| static void check_strict_mode(int);
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| static void check_filter_mode(int);
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| 
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| static struct tcase {
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| 	void (*func_check)();
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| 	int pass_flag;
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| 	int val;
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| 	int exp_signal;
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| 	char *message;
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| } tcases[] = {
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| 	{check_strict_mode, 1, 1, SIGKILL,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT doesn't permit GET_SECCOMP call"},
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| 
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| 	{check_strict_mode, 0, 2, SIGKILL,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT doesn't permit read(2) write(2) and _exit(2)"},
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| 
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| 	{check_strict_mode, 1, 3, SIGKILL,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT doesn't permit close(2)"},
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| 
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| 	{check_filter_mode, 1, 1, SIGSYS,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER doestn't permit GET_SECCOMP call"},
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| 
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| 	{check_filter_mode, 0, 2, SIGSYS,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER doesn't permit close(2)"},
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| 
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| 	{check_filter_mode, 2, 3, SIGSYS,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER doesn't permit exit()"},
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| 
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| 	{check_filter_mode, 0, 4, SIGSYS,
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| 	"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER doesn't permit exit()"}
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| };
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| 
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| static void check_filter_mode_inherit(void)
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| {
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| 	int childpid;
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| 	int childstatus;
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| 
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| 	childpid = SAFE_FORK();
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| 	if (childpid == 0) {
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| 		tst_res(TPASS, "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER permits fork(2)");
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| 		exit(0);
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	wait4(childpid, &childstatus, 0, NULL);
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| 	if (WIFSIGNALED(childstatus) && WTERMSIG(childstatus) == SIGSYS)
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| 		tst_res(TPASS,
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| 			"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER has been inherited by child");
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| 	else
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| 		tst_res(TFAIL,
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| 			"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER isn't been inherited by child");
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| }
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| 
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| static void check_strict_mode(int val)
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| {
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| 	int fd;
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| 	char buf[2];
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| 
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| 	fd = SAFE_OPEN(FNAME, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666);
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| 
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| 	TEST(prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT));
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| 	if (TST_RET == -1) {
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| 		tst_res(TFAIL | TTERRNO,
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| 			"prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) sets SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT failed");
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| 		return;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	switch (val) {
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| 	case 1:
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| 		tst_res(TPASS,
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| 			"prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) sets SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT succeed");
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| 		prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP);
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| 		tst_res(TFAIL, "prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP) succeed unexpectedly");
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| 	break;
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| 	case 2:
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| 		SAFE_WRITE(1, fd, "a", 1);
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| 		SAFE_READ(0, fd, buf, 1);
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| 		tst_res(TPASS,
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| 			"SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT permits read(2) write(2) and _exit(2)");
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| 	break;
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| 	case 3:
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| 		close(fd);
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| 		tst_res(TFAIL,
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| 			"SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT permits close(2) unexpectdly");
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| 	break;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	tst_syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
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| }
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| 
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| static void check_filter_mode(int val)
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| {
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| 	int fd;
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| 
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| 	fd = SAFE_OPEN(FNAME, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0666);
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| 
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| 	TEST(prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &strict));
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| 	if (TST_RET == -1) {
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| 		if (TST_ERR == EINVAL)
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| 			tst_res(TCONF,
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| 				"kernel doesn't support SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER");
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| 		else
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| 			tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO,
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| 				"prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) sets SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER failed");
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| 		return;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	switch (val) {
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| 	case 1:
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| 		tst_res(TPASS,
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| 			"prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP) sets SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER succeed");
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| 		prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP);
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| 		tst_res(TFAIL, "prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP) succeed unexpectedly");
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| 	break;
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| 	case 2:
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| 		close(fd);
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| 		tst_res(TPASS, "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER permits close(2)");
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| 	break;
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| 	case 3:
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| 		exit(0);
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| 	break;
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| 	case 4:
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| 		check_filter_mode_inherit();
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| 	break;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	tst_syscall(__NR_exit, 0);
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| }
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| 
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| static void verify_prctl(unsigned int n)
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| {
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| 	int pid;
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| 	int status;
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| 	struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n];
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| 
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| 	pid = SAFE_FORK();
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| 	if (pid == 0) {
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| 		tc->func_check(tc->val);
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| 	} else {
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| 		SAFE_WAITPID(pid, &status, 0);
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| 		if (WIFSIGNALED(status) && WTERMSIG(status) == tc->exp_signal) {
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| 			if (tc->pass_flag)
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| 				tst_res(TPASS, "%s", tc->message);
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| 			else
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| 				tst_res(TFAIL, "%s", tc->message);
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| 			return;
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| 		}
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| 
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| 		if (tc->pass_flag == 2)
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| 			tst_res(TFAIL,
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| 				"SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER permits exit() unexpectedly");
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| 	}
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| }
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| 
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| static void setup(void)
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| {
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| 	TEST(prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP));
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| 	if (TST_RET == 0) {
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| 		tst_res(TINFO, "kernel support PR_GET/SET_SECCOMP");
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| 		return;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	if (TST_ERR == EINVAL)
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| 		tst_brk(TCONF, "kernel doesn't support PR_GET/SET_SECCOMP");
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| 
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| 	tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
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| 		"current environment doesn't permit PR_GET/SET_SECCOMP");
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| }
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| 
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| static struct tst_test test = {
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| 	.setup = setup,
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| 	.test = verify_prctl,
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| 	.tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tcases),
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| 	.forks_child = 1,
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| 	.needs_tmpdir = 1,
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| 	.needs_root = 1,
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| };
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