803 lines
33 KiB
C++
803 lines
33 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
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#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
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#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
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#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
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#include <android/binder_manager.h>
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#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
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#include <cppbor_parse.h>
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#include <gmock/gmock.h>
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#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
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#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
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#include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
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#include <set>
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#include <vector>
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#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
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namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
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using ::std::string;
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using ::std::vector;
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namespace {
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constexpr int32_t VERSION_WITH_UNIQUE_ID_SUPPORT = 2;
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#define INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(name) \
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GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(name); \
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INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P( \
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PerInstance, name, \
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testing::ValuesIn(VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests::build_params()), \
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::android::PrintInstanceNameToString)
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using ::android::sp;
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using bytevec = std::vector<uint8_t>;
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using testing::MatchesRegex;
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using namespace remote_prov;
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using namespace keymaster;
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std::set<std::string> getAllowedVbStates() {
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return {"green", "yellow", "orange"};
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}
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std::set<std::string> getAllowedBootloaderStates() {
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return {"locked", "unlocked"};
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}
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std::set<std::string> getAllowedSecurityLevels() {
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return {"tee", "strongbox"};
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}
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std::set<std::string> getAllowedAttIdStates() {
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return {"locked", "open"};
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}
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bytevec string_to_bytevec(const char* s) {
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const uint8_t* p = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(s);
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return bytevec(p, p + strlen(s));
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}
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ErrMsgOr<MacedPublicKey> corrupt_maced_key(const MacedPublicKey& macedPubKey) {
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auto [coseMac0, _, mac0ParseErr] = cppbor::parse(macedPubKey.macedKey);
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if (!coseMac0 || coseMac0->asArray()->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
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return "COSE Mac0 parse failed";
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}
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auto protParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
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auto unprotParams = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
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auto payload = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
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auto tag = coseMac0->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
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if (!protParams || !unprotParams || !payload || !tag) {
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return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";
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}
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auto corruptMac0 = cppbor::Array();
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corruptMac0.add(protParams->clone());
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corruptMac0.add(unprotParams->clone());
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corruptMac0.add(payload->clone());
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vector<uint8_t> tagData = tag->value();
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tagData[0] ^= 0x08;
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tagData[tagData.size() - 1] ^= 0x80;
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corruptMac0.add(cppbor::Bstr(tagData));
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return MacedPublicKey{corruptMac0.encode()};
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}
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ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> corrupt_sig(const cppbor::Array* coseSign1) {
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if (coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
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return "Invalid COSE_Sign1, wrong entry count";
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}
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const cppbor::Bstr* protectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
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const cppbor::Map* unprotectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
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const cppbor::Bstr* payload = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Payload)->asBstr();
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const cppbor::Bstr* signature = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Signature)->asBstr();
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if (!protectedParams || !unprotectedParams || !payload || !signature) {
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return "Invalid COSE_Sign1: missing content";
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}
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auto corruptSig = cppbor::Array();
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corruptSig.add(protectedParams->clone());
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corruptSig.add(unprotectedParams->clone());
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corruptSig.add(payload->clone());
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vector<uint8_t> sigData = signature->value();
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sigData[0] ^= 0x08;
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corruptSig.add(cppbor::Bstr(sigData));
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return std::move(corruptSig);
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}
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ErrMsgOr<bytevec> corrupt_sig_chain(const bytevec& encodedEekChain, int which) {
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auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(encodedEekChain);
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if (!chain || !chain->asArray()) {
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return "EekChain parse failed";
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}
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cppbor::Array* eekChain = chain->asArray();
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if (which >= eekChain->size()) {
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return "selected sig out of range";
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}
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auto corruptChain = cppbor::Array();
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for (int ii = 0; ii < eekChain->size(); ++ii) {
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if (ii == which) {
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auto sig = corrupt_sig(eekChain->get(which)->asArray());
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if (!sig) {
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return "Failed to build corrupted signature" + sig.moveMessage();
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}
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corruptChain.add(sig.moveValue());
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} else {
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corruptChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
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}
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}
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return corruptChain.encode();
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}
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string device_suffix(const string& name) {
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size_t pos = name.find('/');
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if (pos == string::npos) {
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return name;
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}
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return name.substr(pos + 1);
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}
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bool matching_keymint_device(const string& rp_name, std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice>* keyMint) {
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string rp_suffix = device_suffix(rp_name);
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vector<string> km_names = ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IKeyMintDevice::descriptor);
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for (const string& km_name : km_names) {
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// If the suffix of the KeyMint instance equals the suffix of the
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// RemotelyProvisionedComponent instance, assume they match.
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if (device_suffix(km_name) == rp_suffix && AServiceManager_isDeclared(km_name.c_str())) {
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::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(km_name.c_str()));
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*keyMint = IKeyMintDevice::fromBinder(binder);
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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} // namespace
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class VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
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public:
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virtual void SetUp() override {
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if (AServiceManager_isDeclared(GetParam().c_str())) {
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::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(GetParam().c_str()));
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provisionable_ = IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::fromBinder(binder);
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}
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ASSERT_NE(provisionable_, nullptr);
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ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&rpcHardwareInfo).isOk());
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}
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static vector<string> build_params() {
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auto params = ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::descriptor);
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return params;
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}
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protected:
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std::shared_ptr<IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> provisionable_;
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RpcHardwareInfo rpcHardwareInfo;
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};
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/**
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* Verify that every implementation reports a different unique id.
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*/
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TEST(NonParameterizedTests, eachRpcHasAUniqueId) {
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std::set<std::string> uniqueIds;
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for (auto hal : ::android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::descriptor)) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(AServiceManager_isDeclared(hal.c_str()));
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::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(hal.c_str()));
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std::shared_ptr<IRemotelyProvisionedComponent> rpc =
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IRemotelyProvisionedComponent::fromBinder(binder);
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ASSERT_NE(rpc, nullptr);
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RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
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ASSERT_TRUE(rpc->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
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int32_t version;
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ASSERT_TRUE(rpc->getInterfaceVersion(&version).isOk());
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if (version >= VERSION_WITH_UNIQUE_ID_SUPPORT) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(hwInfo.uniqueId);
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auto [_, wasInserted] = uniqueIds.insert(*hwInfo.uniqueId);
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EXPECT_TRUE(wasInserted);
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} else {
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ASSERT_FALSE(hwInfo.uniqueId);
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}
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}
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}
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using GetHardwareInfoTests = VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests;
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INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTests);
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/**
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* Verify that a valid curve is reported by the implementation.
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*/
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TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTests, supportsValidCurve) {
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RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
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ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
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const std::set<int> validCurves = {RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_P256, RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_25519};
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ASSERT_EQ(validCurves.count(hwInfo.supportedEekCurve), 1)
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<< "Invalid curve: " << hwInfo.supportedEekCurve;
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}
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/**
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* Verify that the unique id is within the length limits as described in RpcHardwareInfo.aidl.
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*/
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TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTests, uniqueId) {
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int32_t version;
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ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getInterfaceVersion(&version).isOk());
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if (version < VERSION_WITH_UNIQUE_ID_SUPPORT) {
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return;
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}
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RpcHardwareInfo hwInfo;
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ASSERT_TRUE(provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&hwInfo).isOk());
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ASSERT_TRUE(hwInfo.uniqueId);
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EXPECT_GE(hwInfo.uniqueId->size(), 1);
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EXPECT_LE(hwInfo.uniqueId->size(), 32);
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}
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using GenerateKeyTests = VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests;
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INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(GenerateKeyTests);
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/**
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* Generate and validate a production-mode key. MAC tag can't be verified, but
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* the private key blob should be usable in KeyMint operations.
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*/
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TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
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MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
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bytevec privateKeyBlob;
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bool testMode = false;
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auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
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ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
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vector<uint8_t> coseKeyData;
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check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, &coseKeyData);
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}
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/**
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* Generate and validate a production-mode key, then use it as a KeyMint attestation key.
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*/
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TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateAndUseEcdsaP256Key_prodMode) {
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// See if there is a matching IKeyMintDevice for this IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
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std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keyMint;
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if (!matching_keymint_device(GetParam(), &keyMint)) {
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// No matching IKeyMintDevice.
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GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping key use test as no matching KeyMint device found";
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return;
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}
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KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
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ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint->getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
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MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
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bytevec privateKeyBlob;
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bool testMode = false;
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auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
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ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
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vector<uint8_t> coseKeyData;
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check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, &coseKeyData);
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AttestationKey attestKey;
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attestKey.keyBlob = std::move(privateKeyBlob);
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attestKey.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
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// Generate an ECDSA key that is attested by the generated P256 keypair.
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AuthorizationSet keyDesc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
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.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
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.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
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.AttestationChallenge("foo")
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.AttestationApplicationId("bar")
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.Digest(Digest::NONE)
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.SetDefaultValidity();
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KeyCreationResult creationResult;
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auto result = keyMint->generateKey(keyDesc.vector_data(), attestKey, &creationResult);
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ASSERT_TRUE(result.isOk());
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vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob = std::move(creationResult.keyBlob);
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vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics =
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std::move(creationResult.keyCharacteristics);
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vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain = std::move(creationResult.certificateChain);
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EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
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int32_t aidl_version = 0;
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ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint->getInterfaceVersion(&aidl_version).isOk());
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AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
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AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
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EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(aidl_version, "foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
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info.securityLevel,
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attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
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// Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
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EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
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// The signature over the attested key should correspond to the P256 public key.
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X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
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ASSERT_TRUE(key_cert.get());
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EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey;
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p256_pub_key(coseKeyData, &signing_pubkey);
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ASSERT_TRUE(signing_pubkey.get());
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ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get()))
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<< "Verification of attested certificate failed "
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<< "OpenSSL error string: " << ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL);
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}
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/**
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* Generate and validate a test-mode key.
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*/
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TEST_P(GenerateKeyTests, generateEcdsaP256Key_testMode) {
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MacedPublicKey macedPubKey;
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bytevec privateKeyBlob;
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bool testMode = true;
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auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &macedPubKey, &privateKeyBlob);
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ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk());
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check_maced_pubkey(macedPubKey, testMode, nullptr);
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}
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class CertificateRequestTest : public VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests {
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protected:
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CertificateRequestTest() : eekId_(string_to_bytevec("eekid")), challenge_(randomBytes(64)) {}
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void generateTestEekChain(size_t eekLength) {
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auto chain = generateEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve, eekLength, eekId_);
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ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
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if (chain) testEekChain_ = chain.moveValue();
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testEekLength_ = eekLength;
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}
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void generateKeys(bool testMode, size_t numKeys) {
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keysToSign_ = std::vector<MacedPublicKey>(numKeys);
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cborKeysToSign_ = cppbor::Array();
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for (auto& key : keysToSign_) {
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bytevec privateKeyBlob;
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auto status = provisionable_->generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(testMode, &key, &privateKeyBlob);
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ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
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vector<uint8_t> payload_value;
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check_maced_pubkey(key, testMode, &payload_value);
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cborKeysToSign_.add(cppbor::EncodedItem(payload_value));
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}
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}
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ErrMsgOr<bytevec> getSessionKey(ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec, bytevec>>& senderPubkey) {
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if (rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve == RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_25519 ||
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rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve == RpcHardwareInfo::CURVE_NONE) {
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return x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(testEekChain_.last_pubkey, testEekChain_.last_privkey,
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senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
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} else {
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return ECDH_HKDF_DeriveKey(testEekChain_.last_pubkey, testEekChain_.last_privkey,
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senderPubkey->first, false /* senderIsA */);
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}
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}
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void checkProtectedData(const DeviceInfo& deviceInfo, const cppbor::Array& keysToSign,
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const bytevec& keysToSignMac, const ProtectedData& protectedData,
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std::vector<BccEntryData>* bccOutput = nullptr) {
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auto [parsedProtectedData, _, protDataErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedData.protectedData);
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ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData) << protDataErrMsg;
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ASSERT_TRUE(parsedProtectedData->asArray());
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ASSERT_EQ(parsedProtectedData->asArray()->size(), kCoseEncryptEntryCount);
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auto senderPubkey = getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(parsedProtectedData);
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ASSERT_TRUE(senderPubkey) << senderPubkey.message();
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EXPECT_EQ(senderPubkey->second, eekId_);
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auto sessionKey = getSessionKey(senderPubkey);
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ASSERT_TRUE(sessionKey) << sessionKey.message();
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auto protectedDataPayload =
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decryptCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, parsedProtectedData.get(), bytevec{} /* aad */);
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ASSERT_TRUE(protectedDataPayload) << protectedDataPayload.message();
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auto [parsedPayload, __, payloadErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(*protectedDataPayload);
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ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload) << "Failed to parse payload: " << payloadErrMsg;
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ASSERT_TRUE(parsedPayload->asArray());
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// Strongbox may contain additional certificate chain.
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EXPECT_LE(parsedPayload->asArray()->size(), 3U);
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auto& signedMac = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(0);
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auto& bcc = parsedPayload->asArray()->get(1);
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ASSERT_TRUE(signedMac && signedMac->asArray());
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ASSERT_TRUE(bcc && bcc->asArray());
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// BCC is [ pubkey, + BccEntry]
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auto bccContents = validateBcc(bcc->asArray());
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ASSERT_TRUE(bccContents) << "\n" << bccContents.message() << "\n" << prettyPrint(bcc.get());
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ASSERT_GT(bccContents->size(), 0U);
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auto [deviceInfoMap, __2, deviceInfoErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(deviceInfo.deviceInfo);
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ASSERT_TRUE(deviceInfoMap) << "Failed to parse deviceInfo: " << deviceInfoErrMsg;
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ASSERT_TRUE(deviceInfoMap->asMap());
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checkDeviceInfo(deviceInfoMap->asMap(), deviceInfo.deviceInfo);
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auto& signingKey = bccContents->back().pubKey;
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deviceInfoMap->asMap()->canonicalize();
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auto macKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(signedMac->asArray(), signingKey,
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cppbor::Array() // SignedMacAad
|
|
.add(challenge_)
|
|
.add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
|
|
.add(keysToSignMac)
|
|
.encode());
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
|
|
|
|
auto coseMac0 = cppbor::Array()
|
|
.add(cppbor::Map() // protected
|
|
.add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256)
|
|
.canonicalize()
|
|
.encode())
|
|
.add(cppbor::Map()) // unprotected
|
|
.add(keysToSign.encode()) // payload (keysToSign)
|
|
.add(keysToSignMac); // tag
|
|
|
|
auto macPayload = verifyAndParseCoseMac0(&coseMac0, *macKey);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(macPayload) << macPayload.message();
|
|
|
|
if (bccOutput) {
|
|
*bccOutput = std::move(*bccContents);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void checkType(const cppbor::Map* devInfo, uint8_t majorType, std::string entryName) {
|
|
const auto& val = devInfo->get(entryName);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(val) << entryName << " does not exist";
|
|
ASSERT_EQ(val->type(), majorType) << entryName << " has the wrong type.";
|
|
switch (majorType) {
|
|
case cppbor::TSTR:
|
|
EXPECT_GT(val->asTstr()->value().size(), 0);
|
|
break;
|
|
case cppbor::BSTR:
|
|
EXPECT_GT(val->asBstr()->value().size(), 0);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void checkDeviceInfo(const cppbor::Map* deviceInfo, bytevec deviceInfoBytes) {
|
|
EXPECT_EQ(deviceInfo->clone()->asMap()->canonicalize().encode(), deviceInfoBytes)
|
|
<< "DeviceInfo ordering is non-canonical.";
|
|
const auto& version = deviceInfo->get("version");
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(version);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(version->asUint());
|
|
RpcHardwareInfo info;
|
|
provisionable_->getHardwareInfo(&info);
|
|
ASSERT_EQ(version->asUint()->value(), info.versionNumber);
|
|
std::set<std::string> allowList;
|
|
switch (version->asUint()->value()) {
|
|
// These fields became mandated in version 2.
|
|
case 2:
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "brand");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "manufacturer");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "product");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "model");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "device");
|
|
// TODO: Refactor the KeyMint code that validates these fields and include it here.
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "vb_state");
|
|
allowList = getAllowedVbStates();
|
|
EXPECT_NE(allowList.find(deviceInfo->get("vb_state")->asTstr()->value()),
|
|
allowList.end());
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "bootloader_state");
|
|
allowList = getAllowedBootloaderStates();
|
|
EXPECT_NE(allowList.find(deviceInfo->get("bootloader_state")->asTstr()->value()),
|
|
allowList.end());
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::BSTR, "vbmeta_digest");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "system_patch_level");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "boot_patch_level");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "vendor_patch_level");
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::UINT, "fused");
|
|
EXPECT_LT(deviceInfo->get("fused")->asUint()->value(), 2); // Must be 0 or 1.
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "security_level");
|
|
allowList = getAllowedSecurityLevels();
|
|
EXPECT_NE(allowList.find(deviceInfo->get("security_level")->asTstr()->value()),
|
|
allowList.end());
|
|
if (deviceInfo->get("security_level")->asTstr()->value() == "tee") {
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "os_version");
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case 1:
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "security_level");
|
|
allowList = getAllowedSecurityLevels();
|
|
EXPECT_NE(allowList.find(deviceInfo->get("security_level")->asTstr()->value()),
|
|
allowList.end());
|
|
if (version->asUint()->value() == 1) {
|
|
checkType(deviceInfo, cppbor::TSTR, "att_id_state");
|
|
allowList = getAllowedAttIdStates();
|
|
EXPECT_NE(allowList.find(deviceInfo->get("att_id_state")->asTstr()->value()),
|
|
allowList.end());
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
FAIL() << "Unrecognized version: " << version->asUint()->value();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bytevec eekId_;
|
|
size_t testEekLength_;
|
|
EekChain testEekChain_;
|
|
bytevec challenge_;
|
|
std::vector<MacedPublicKey> keysToSign_;
|
|
cppbor::Array cborKeysToSign_;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate an empty certificate request in test mode, and decrypt and verify the structure and
|
|
* content.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, EmptyRequest_testMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = true;
|
|
for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
|
|
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
|
|
generateTestEekChain(eekLength);
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
|
|
|
|
checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Ensure that test mode outputs a unique BCC root key every time we request a
|
|
* certificate request. Else, it's possible that the test mode API could be used
|
|
* to fingerprint devices. Only the GEEK should be allowed to decrypt the same
|
|
* device public key multiple times.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NewKeyPerCallInTestMode) {
|
|
constexpr bool testMode = true;
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
generateTestEekChain(3);
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
|
|
|
|
std::vector<BccEntryData> firstBcc;
|
|
checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
|
|
&firstBcc);
|
|
|
|
status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
|
|
|
|
std::vector<BccEntryData> secondBcc;
|
|
checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, /*keysToSign=*/cppbor::Array(), keysToSignMac, protectedData,
|
|
&secondBcc);
|
|
|
|
// Verify that none of the keys in the first BCC are repeated in the second one.
|
|
for (const auto& i : firstBcc) {
|
|
for (auto& j : secondBcc) {
|
|
ASSERT_THAT(i.pubKey, testing::Not(testing::ElementsAreArray(j.pubKey)))
|
|
<< "Found a repeated pubkey in two generateCertificateRequest test mode calls";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate an empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and
|
|
* is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all
|
|
* trust the Google EEK root.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_EmptyRequest_prodMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = false;
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, {} /* keysToSign */, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve),
|
|
challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode. Decrypt, parse and validate the contents.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = true;
|
|
generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
|
|
|
|
for (size_t eekLength : {2, 3, 7}) {
|
|
SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "EEK of length " << eekLength);
|
|
generateTestEekChain(eekLength);
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
|
|
&keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
|
|
|
|
checkProtectedData(deviceInfo, cborKeysToSign_, keysToSignMac, protectedData);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode. This test must be run explicitly, and
|
|
* is not run by default. Not all devices are GMS devices, and therefore they do not all
|
|
* trust the Google EEK root.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, DISABLED_NonEmptyRequest_prodMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = false;
|
|
generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, keysToSign_, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve), challenge_,
|
|
&deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_testMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = true;
|
|
generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
|
|
auto result = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.moveMessage();
|
|
MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = result.moveValue();
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
generateTestEekChain(3);
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
|
|
EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, but with the MAC corrupted on the keypair.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequestCorruptMac_prodMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = false;
|
|
generateKeys(testMode, 1 /* numKeys */);
|
|
auto result = corrupt_maced_key(keysToSign_[0]);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(result) << result.moveMessage();
|
|
MacedPublicKey keyWithCorruptMac = result.moveValue();
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, {keyWithCorruptMac}, getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve),
|
|
challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk()) << status.getMessage();
|
|
EXPECT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has a corrupt EEK chain.
|
|
* Confirm that the request is rejected.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyCorruptEekRequest_prodMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = false;
|
|
generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
|
|
|
|
auto prodEekChain = getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve);
|
|
auto [parsedChain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(prodEekChain);
|
|
ASSERT_NE(parsedChain, nullptr) << parseErr;
|
|
ASSERT_NE(parsedChain->asArray(), nullptr);
|
|
|
|
for (int ii = 0; ii < parsedChain->asArray()->size(); ++ii) {
|
|
auto chain = corrupt_sig_chain(prodEekChain, ii);
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(chain) << chain.message();
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(testMode, keysToSign_, *chain,
|
|
challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
|
|
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
|
|
BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode that has an incomplete EEK chain.
|
|
* Confirm that the request is rejected.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyIncompleteEekRequest_prodMode) {
|
|
bool testMode = false;
|
|
generateKeys(testMode, 4 /* numKeys */);
|
|
|
|
// Build an EEK chain that omits the first self-signed cert.
|
|
auto truncatedChain = cppbor::Array();
|
|
auto [chain, _, parseErr] = cppbor::parse(getProdEekChain(rpcHardwareInfo.supportedEekCurve));
|
|
ASSERT_TRUE(chain);
|
|
auto eekChain = chain->asArray();
|
|
ASSERT_NE(eekChain, nullptr);
|
|
for (size_t ii = 1; ii < eekChain->size(); ii++) {
|
|
truncatedChain.add(eekChain->get(ii)->clone());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
testMode, keysToSign_, truncatedChain.encode(), challenge_, &deviceInfo, &protectedData,
|
|
&keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
|
|
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(), BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in test mode, with prod keys. Must fail with
|
|
* STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_prodKeyInTestCert) {
|
|
generateKeys(false /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
generateTestEekChain(3);
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
true /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
|
|
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
|
|
BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate a non-empty certificate request in prod mode, with test keys. Must fail with
|
|
* STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
|
|
*/
|
|
TEST_P(CertificateRequestTest, NonEmptyRequest_testKeyInProdCert) {
|
|
generateKeys(true /* testMode */, 2 /* numKeys */);
|
|
|
|
bytevec keysToSignMac;
|
|
DeviceInfo deviceInfo;
|
|
ProtectedData protectedData;
|
|
generateTestEekChain(3);
|
|
auto status = provisionable_->generateCertificateRequest(
|
|
false /* testMode */, keysToSign_, testEekChain_.chain, challenge_, &deviceInfo,
|
|
&protectedData, &keysToSignMac);
|
|
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
|
|
ASSERT_EQ(status.getServiceSpecificError(),
|
|
BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
INSTANTIATE_REM_PROV_AIDL_TEST(CertificateRequestTest);
|
|
|
|
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
|