275 lines
12 KiB
C
275 lines
12 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
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*
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* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
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* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
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* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
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* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
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* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
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* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
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* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
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* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
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#ifndef OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_ECP_NISTZ_H
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#define OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_ECP_NISTZ_H
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#include <GFp/base.h>
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#include "../../limbs/limbs.h"
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#if defined(__GNUC__)
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#pragma GCC diagnostic push
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#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wconversion"
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#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsign-conversion"
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#endif
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// This function looks at `w + 1` scalar bits (`w` current, 1 adjacent less
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// significant bit), and recodes them into a signed digit for use in fast point
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// multiplication: the use of signed rather than unsigned digits means that
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// fewer points need to be precomputed, given that point inversion is easy (a
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// precomputed point dP makes -dP available as well).
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//
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// BACKGROUND:
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//
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// Signed digits for multiplication were introduced by Booth ("A signed binary
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// multiplication technique", Quart. Journ. Mech. and Applied Math., vol. IV,
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// pt. 2 (1951), pp. 236-240), in that case for multiplication of integers.
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// Booth's original encoding did not generally improve the density of nonzero
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// digits over the binary representation, and was merely meant to simplify the
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// handling of signed factors given in two's complement; but it has since been
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// shown to be the basis of various signed-digit representations that do have
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// further advantages, including the wNAF, using the following general
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// approach:
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//
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// (1) Given a binary representation
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//
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// b_k ... b_2 b_1 b_0,
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//
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// of a nonnegative integer (b_k in {0, 1}), rewrite it in digits 0, 1, -1
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// by using bit-wise subtraction as follows:
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//
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// b_k b_(k-1) ... b_2 b_1 b_0
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// - b_k ... b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0
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// -----------------------------------------
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// s_(k+1) s_k ... s_3 s_2 s_1 s_0
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//
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// A left-shift followed by subtraction of the original value yields a new
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// representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i-1) - b_i.
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// This representation from Booth's paper has since appeared in the
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// literature under a variety of different names including "reversed binary
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// form", "alternating greedy expansion", "mutual opposite form", and
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// "sign-alternating {+-1}-representation".
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//
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// An interesting property is that among the nonzero bits, values 1 and -1
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// strictly alternate.
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//
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// (2) Various window schemes can be applied to the Booth representation of
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// integers: for example, right-to-left sliding windows yield the wNAF
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// (a signed-digit encoding independently discovered by various researchers
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// in the 1990s), and left-to-right sliding windows yield a left-to-right
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// equivalent of the wNAF (independently discovered by various researchers
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// around 2004).
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//
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// To prevent leaking information through side channels in point multiplication,
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// we need to recode the given integer into a regular pattern: sliding windows
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// as in wNAFs won't do, we need their fixed-window equivalent -- which is a few
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// decades older: we'll be using the so-called "modified Booth encoding" due to
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// MacSorley ("High-speed arithmetic in binary computers", Proc. IRE, vol. 49
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// (1961), pp. 67-91), in a radix-2**w setting. That is, we always combine `w`
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// signed bits into a signed digit, e.g. (for `w == 5`):
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//
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// s_(5j + 4) s_(5j + 3) s_(5j + 2) s_(5j + 1) s_(5j)
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//
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// The sign-alternating property implies that the resulting digit values are
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// integers from `-2**(w-1)` to `2**(w-1)`, e.g. -16 to 16 for `w == 5`.
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//
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// Of course, we don't actually need to compute the signed digits s_i as an
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// intermediate step (that's just a nice way to see how this scheme relates
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// to the wNAF): a direct computation obtains the recoded digit from the
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// six bits b_(5j + 4) ... b_(5j - 1).
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//
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// This function takes those `w` bits as an integer (e.g. 0 .. 63), writing the
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// recoded digit to *sign (0 for positive, 1 for negative) and *digit (absolute
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// value, in the range 0 .. 2**(w-1). Note that this integer essentially provides
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// the input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input
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// to compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit
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// b_-1, has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0.
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//
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// DOUBLING CASE:
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//
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// Point addition formulas for short Weierstrass curves are often incomplete.
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// Edge cases such as P + P or P + ∞ must be handled separately. This
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// complicates constant-time requirements. P + ∞ cannot be avoided (any window
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// may be zero) and is handled with constant-time selects. P + P (where P is not
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// ∞) usually is not. Instead, windowing strategies are chosen to avoid this
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// case. Whether this happens depends on the group order.
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//
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// Let w be the window width (in this function, w = 5). The non-trivial doubling
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// case in single-point scalar multiplication may occur if and only if the
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// 2^(w-1) bit of the group order is zero.
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//
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// Note the above only holds if the scalar is fully reduced and the group order
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// is a prime that is much larger than 2^w. It also only holds when windows
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// are applied from most significant to least significant, doubling between each
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// window. It does not apply to more complex table strategies such as
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// |EC_GFp_nistz256_method|.
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//
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// PROOF:
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//
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// Let n be the group order. Let l be the number of bits needed to represent n.
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// Assume there exists some 0 <= k < n such that signed w-bit windowed
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// multiplication hits the doubling case.
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//
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// Windowed multiplication consists of iterating over groups of s_i (defined
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// above based on k's binary representation) from most to least significant. At
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// iteration i (for i = ..., 3w, 2w, w, 0, starting from the most significant
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// window), we:
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//
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// 1. Double the accumulator A, w times. Let A_i be the value of A at this
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// point.
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//
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// 2. Set A to T_i + A_i, where T_i is a precomputed multiple of P
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// corresponding to the window s_(i+w-1) ... s_i.
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//
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// Let j be the index such that A_j = T_j ≠ ∞. Looking at A_i and T_i as
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// multiples of P, define a_i and t_i to be scalar coefficients of A_i and T_i.
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// Thus a_j = t_j ≠ 0 (mod n). Note a_i and t_i may not be reduced mod n. t_i is
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// the value of the w signed bits s_(i+w-1) ... s_i. a_i is computed as a_i =
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// 2^w * (a_(i+w) + t_(i+w)).
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//
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// t_i is bounded by -2^(w-1) <= t_i <= 2^(w-1). Additionally, we may write it
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// in terms of unsigned bits b_i. t_i consists of signed bits s_(i+w-1) ... s_i.
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// This is computed as:
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//
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// b_(i+w-2) b_(i+w-3) ... b_i b_(i-1)
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// - b_(i+w-1) b_(i+w-2) ... b_(i+1) b_i
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// --------------------------------------------
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// t_i = s_(i+w-1) s_(i+w-2) ... s_(i+1) s_i
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//
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// Observe that b_(i+w-2) through b_i occur in both terms. Let x be the integer
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// represented by that bit string, i.e. 2^(w-2)*b_(i+w-2) + ... + b_i.
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//
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// t_i = (2*x + b_(i-1)) - (2^(w-1)*b_(i+w-1) + x)
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// = x - 2^(w-1)*b_(i+w-1) + b_(i-1)
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//
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// Or, using C notation for bit operations:
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//
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// t_i = (k>>i) & ((1<<(w-1)) - 1) - (k>>i) & (1<<(w-1)) + (k>>(i-1)) & 1
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//
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// Note b_(i-1) is added in left-shifted by one (or doubled) from its place.
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// This is compensated by t_(i-w)'s subtraction term. Thus, a_i may be computed
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// by adding b_l b_(l-1) ... b_(i+1) b_i and an extra copy of b_(i-1). In C
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// notation, this is:
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//
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// a_i = (k>>(i+w)) << w + ((k>>(i+w-1)) & 1) << w
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//
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// Observe that, while t_i may be positive or negative, a_i is bounded by
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// 0 <= a_i < n + 2^w. Additionally, a_i can only be zero if b_(i+w-1) and up
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// are all zero. (Note this implies a non-trivial P + (-P) is unreachable for
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// all groups. That would imply the subsequent a_i is zero, which means all
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// terms thus far were zero.)
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//
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// Returning to our doubling position, we have a_j = t_j (mod n). We now
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// determine the value of a_j - t_j, which must be divisible by n. Our bounds on
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// a_j and t_j imply a_j - t_j is 0 or n. If it is 0, a_j = t_j. However, 2^w
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// divides a_j and -2^(w-1) <= t_j <= 2^(w-1), so this can only happen if
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// a_j = t_j = 0, which is a trivial doubling. Therefore, a_j - t_j = n.
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//
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// Now we determine j. Suppose j > 0. w divides j, so j >= w. Then,
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//
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// n = a_j - t_j = (k>>(j+w)) << w + ((k>>(j+w-1)) & 1) << w - t_j
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// <= k/2^j + 2^w - t_j
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// < n/2^w + 2^w + 2^(w-1)
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//
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// n is much larger than 2^w, so this is impossible. Thus, j = 0: only the final
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// addition may hit the doubling case.
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//
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// Finally, we consider bit patterns for n and k. Divide k into k_H + k_M + k_L
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// such that k_H is the contribution from b_(l-1) .. b_w, k_M is the
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// contribution from b_(w-1), and k_L is the contribution from b_(w-2) ... b_0.
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// That is:
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//
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// - 2^w divides k_H
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// - k_M is 0 or 2^(w-1)
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// - 0 <= k_L < 2^(w-1)
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//
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// Divide n into n_H + n_M + n_L similarly. We thus have:
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//
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// t_0 = (k>>0) & ((1<<(w-1)) - 1) - (k>>0) & (1<<(w-1)) + (k>>(0-1)) & 1
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// = k & ((1<<(w-1)) - 1) - k & (1<<(w-1))
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// = k_L - k_M
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//
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// a_0 = (k>>(0+w)) << w + ((k>>(0+w-1)) & 1) << w
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// = (k>>w) << w + ((k>>(w-1)) & 1) << w
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// = k_H + 2*k_M
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//
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// n = a_0 - t_0
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// n_H + n_M + n_L = (k_H + 2*k_M) - (k_L - k_M)
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// = k_H + 3*k_M - k_L
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//
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// k_H - k_L < k and k < n, so k_H - k_L ≠ n. Therefore k_M is not 0 and must be
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// 2^(w-1). Now we consider k_H and n_H. We know k_H <= n_H. Suppose k_H = n_H.
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// Then,
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//
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// n_M + n_L = 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
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// > 3*(2^(w-1)) - 2^(w-1)
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// = 2^w
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//
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// Contradiction (n_M + n_L is the bottom w bits of n). Thus k_H < n_H. Suppose
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// k_H < n_H - 2*2^w. Then,
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//
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// n_H + n_M + n_L = k_H + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
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// < n_H - 2*2^w + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
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// n_M + n_L < -2^(w-1) - k_L
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//
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// Contradiction. Thus, k_H = n_H - 2^w. (Note 2^w divides n_H and k_H.) Thus,
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//
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// n_H + n_M + n_L = k_H + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
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// = n_H - 2^w + 3*(2^(w-1)) - k_L
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// n_M + n_L = 2^(w-1) - k_L
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// <= 2^(w-1)
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//
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// Equality would mean 2^(w-1) divides n, which is impossible if n is prime.
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// Thus n_M + n_L < 2^(w-1), so n_M is zero, proving our condition.
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//
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// This proof constructs k, so, to show the converse, let k_H = n_H - 2^w,
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// k_M = 2^(w-1), k_L = 2^(w-1) - n_L. This will result in a non-trivial point
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// doubling in the final addition and is the only such scalar.
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//
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// COMMON CURVES:
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//
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// The group orders for common curves end in the following bit patterns:
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//
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// P-521: ...00001001; w = 4 is okay
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// P-384: ...01110011; w = 2, 5, 6, 7 are okay
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// P-256: ...01010001; w = 5, 7 are okay
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// P-224: ...00111101; w = 3, 4, 5, 6 are okay
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static inline void booth_recode(crypto_word *is_negative, crypto_word *digit,
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crypto_word in, crypto_word w) {
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debug_assert_nonsecret(w >= 2);
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debug_assert_nonsecret(w <= 7);
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// Set all bits of `s` to MSB(in), similar to |constant_time_msb_s|,
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// but 'in' seen as (`w+1`)-bit value.
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crypto_word s = ~((in >> w) - 1);
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crypto_word d;
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d = ((crypto_word)1u << (w + 1)) - in - 1;
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d = (d & s) | (in & ~s);
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d = (d >> 1) + (d & 1);
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*is_negative = constant_time_is_nonzero_w(s & 1);
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*digit = d;
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}
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#if defined(__GNUC__)
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#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
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#endif
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void gfp_little_endian_bytes_from_scalar(uint8_t str[], size_t str_len,
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const Limb scalar[],
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size_t num_limbs);
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#endif // OPENSSL_HEADER_EC_ECP_NISTZ_H
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