1002 lines
		
	
	
		
			41 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C++
		
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			1002 lines
		
	
	
		
			41 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C++
		
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * Copyright 2014 The Android Open Source Project
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|  *
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|  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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|  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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|  * You may obtain a copy of the License at
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|  *
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|  *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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|  *
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|  * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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|  * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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|  * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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|  * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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|  * limitations under the License.
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <keymaster/android_keymaster.h>
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| 
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| #include <vector>
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| 
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| #include <assert.h>
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| #include <string.h>
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| 
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| #include <stddef.h>
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| 
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| #include <cppbor.h>
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| #include <cppbor_parse.h>
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| 
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| #include <keymaster/UniquePtr.h>
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| #include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h>
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| #include <keymaster/attestation_context.h>
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| #include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
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| #include <keymaster/key.h>
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| #include <keymaster/key_blob_utils/ae.h>
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| #include <keymaster/key_factory.h>
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| #include <keymaster/keymaster_context.h>
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| #include <keymaster/km_date.h>
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| #include <keymaster/km_openssl/openssl_err.h>
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| #include <keymaster/km_openssl/openssl_utils.h>
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| #include <keymaster/logger.h>
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| #include <keymaster/operation.h>
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| #include <keymaster/operation_table.h>
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| #include <keymaster/remote_provisioning_utils.h>
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| #include <keymaster/secure_deletion_secret_storage.h>
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| 
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| namespace keymaster {
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| 
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| namespace {
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| 
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| using cppcose::constructCoseEncrypt;
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| using cppcose::constructCoseMac0;
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| using cppcose::CoseKey;
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| using cppcose::EC2;
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| using cppcose::ES256;
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| using cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac;
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| using cppcose::kAesGcmNonceLength;
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| using cppcose::P256;
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| using cppcose::x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey;
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| 
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| template <keymaster_tag_t T>
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| keymaster_error_t CheckPatchLevel(const AuthorizationSet& tee_enforced,
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|                                   const AuthorizationSet& sw_enforced, TypedTag<KM_UINT, T> tag,
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|                                   uint32_t current_patchlevel) {
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|     uint32_t key_patchlevel;
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|     if (tee_enforced.GetTagValue(tag, &key_patchlevel) ||
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|         sw_enforced.GetTagValue(tag, &key_patchlevel)) {
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|         if (key_patchlevel < current_patchlevel) {
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|             return KM_ERROR_KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE;
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|         } else if (key_patchlevel > current_patchlevel) {
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|             LOG_E("Key blob invalid! key patchlevel %lu is > current patchlevel %lu",
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|                   (unsigned long)key_patchlevel, (unsigned long)current_patchlevel);
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|             return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
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|         }
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|     }
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|     return KM_ERROR_OK;
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| }
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| 
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| keymaster_error_t CheckVersionInfo(const AuthorizationSet& tee_enforced,
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|                                    const AuthorizationSet& sw_enforced,
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|                                    const KeymasterContext& context) {
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|     uint32_t os_version;
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|     uint32_t os_patchlevel;
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|     context.GetSystemVersion(&os_version, &os_patchlevel);
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| 
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|     keymaster_error_t err =
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|         CheckPatchLevel(tee_enforced, sw_enforced, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patchlevel);
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|     if (err != KM_ERROR_OK) return err;
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| 
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|     // Also check the vendor and boot patchlevels if available.
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|     auto vendor_patchlevel = context.GetVendorPatchlevel();
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|     if (vendor_patchlevel.has_value()) {
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|         err = CheckPatchLevel(tee_enforced, sw_enforced, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL,
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|                               vendor_patchlevel.value());
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|         if (err != KM_ERROR_OK) return err;
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|     }
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|     auto boot_patchlevel = context.GetBootPatchlevel();
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|     if (boot_patchlevel.has_value()) {
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|         err = CheckPatchLevel(tee_enforced, sw_enforced, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
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|                               boot_patchlevel.value());
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|         if (err != KM_ERROR_OK) return err;
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|     }
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| 
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|     return KM_ERROR_OK;
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| }
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| 
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| const keymaster_key_param_t kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params[] = {
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|     Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY),
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|     Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_EC), Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256),
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|     Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256), Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, KM_EC_CURVE_P_256),
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|     Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
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|     // The certificate generated by KM will be discarded, these values don't matter.
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|     Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, 0), Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, 0)};
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| 
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| cppcose::HmacSha256Function getMacFunction(bool test_mode,
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|                                            RemoteProvisioningContext* rem_prov_ctx) {
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|     if (test_mode) {
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|         return [](const cppcose::bytevec& input) {
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|             const cppcose::bytevec macKey(32);
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|             return cppcose::generateHmacSha256(macKey, input);
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|         };
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|     }
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| 
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|     return [rem_prov_ctx](const cppcose::bytevec& input) -> cppcose::ErrMsgOr<cppcose::HmacSha256> {
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|         auto mac = rem_prov_ctx->GenerateHmacSha256(input);
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|         if (!mac) {
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|             return "Remote provisioning context failed to sign MAC.";
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|         }
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|         return *mac;
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|     };
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| }
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| 
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| std::pair<const uint8_t*, size_t> blob2Pair(const keymaster_blob_t& blob) {
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|     return {blob.data, blob.data_length};
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| }
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| 
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| constexpr int kP256AffinePointSize = 32;
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| constexpr int kRoTVersion1 = 40001;
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| 
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| }  // anonymous namespace
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| 
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| AndroidKeymaster::AndroidKeymaster(KeymasterContext* context, size_t operation_table_size,
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|                                    int32_t message_version)
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|     : context_(context), operation_table_(new (std::nothrow) OperationTable(operation_table_size)),
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|       message_version_(message_version) {}
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| 
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| AndroidKeymaster::~AndroidKeymaster() {}
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| 
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| AndroidKeymaster::AndroidKeymaster(AndroidKeymaster&& other)
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|     : context_(move(other.context_)), operation_table_(move(other.operation_table_)),
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|       message_version_(other.message_version_) {}
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| 
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| // TODO(swillden): Unify support analysis.  Right now, we have per-keytype methods that determine if
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| // specific modes, padding, etc. are supported for that key type, and AndroidKeymaster also has
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| // methods that return the same information.  They'll get out of sync.  Best to put the knowledge in
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| // the keytypes and provide some mechanism for AndroidKeymaster to query the keytypes for the
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| // information.
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| 
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| template <typename T>
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| bool check_supported(const KeymasterContext& context, keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm,
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|                      SupportedResponse<T>* response) {
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|     if (context.GetKeyFactory(algorithm) == nullptr) {
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|         response->error = KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;
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|         return false;
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|     }
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|     return true;
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::GetVersion(const GetVersionRequest&, GetVersionResponse* rsp) {
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|     if (rsp == nullptr) return;
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| 
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|     rsp->major_ver = 2;
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|     rsp->minor_ver = 0;
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|     rsp->subminor_ver = 0;
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|     rsp->error = KM_ERROR_OK;
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| }
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| 
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| GetVersion2Response AndroidKeymaster::GetVersion2(const GetVersion2Request& req) {
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|     GetVersion2Response rsp;
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|     rsp.km_version = context_->GetKmVersion();
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|     rsp.km_date = kKmDate;
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|     rsp.max_message_version = MessageVersion(rsp.km_version, rsp.km_date);
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|     rsp.error = KM_ERROR_OK;
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| 
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|     // Determine what message version we should use.
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|     message_version_ = NegotiateMessageVersion(req, rsp);
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| 
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|     LOG_D("GetVersion2 results: %d, %d, %d, %d", rsp.km_version, rsp.km_date,
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|           rsp.max_message_version, message_version_);
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|     return rsp;
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::SupportedAlgorithms(const SupportedAlgorithmsRequest& /* request */,
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|                                            SupportedAlgorithmsResponse* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr) return;
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| 
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|     response->error = KM_ERROR_OK;
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| 
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|     size_t algorithm_count = 0;
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|     const keymaster_algorithm_t* algorithms = context_->GetSupportedAlgorithms(&algorithm_count);
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|     if (algorithm_count == 0) return;
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|     response->results_length = algorithm_count;
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|     response->results = dup_array(algorithms, algorithm_count);
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|     if (!response->results) response->error = KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
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| }
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| 
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| template <typename T>
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| void GetSupported(const KeymasterContext& context, keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm,
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|                   keymaster_purpose_t purpose,
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|                   const T* (OperationFactory::*get_supported_method)(size_t* count) const,
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|                   SupportedResponse<T>* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr || !check_supported(context, algorithm, response)) return;
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| 
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|     const OperationFactory* factory = context.GetOperationFactory(algorithm, purpose);
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|     if (!factory) {
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|         response->error = KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE;
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     size_t count;
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|     const T* supported = (factory->*get_supported_method)(&count);
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|     response->SetResults(supported, count);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::SupportedBlockModes(const SupportedBlockModesRequest& request,
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|                                            SupportedBlockModesResponse* response) {
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|     GetSupported(*context_, request.algorithm, request.purpose,
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|                  &OperationFactory::SupportedBlockModes, response);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::SupportedPaddingModes(const SupportedPaddingModesRequest& request,
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|                                              SupportedPaddingModesResponse* response) {
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|     GetSupported(*context_, request.algorithm, request.purpose,
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|                  &OperationFactory::SupportedPaddingModes, response);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::SupportedDigests(const SupportedDigestsRequest& request,
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|                                         SupportedDigestsResponse* response) {
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|     GetSupported(*context_, request.algorithm, request.purpose, &OperationFactory::SupportedDigests,
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|                  response);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::SupportedImportFormats(const SupportedImportFormatsRequest& request,
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|                                               SupportedImportFormatsResponse* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr || !check_supported(*context_, request.algorithm, response)) return;
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| 
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|     size_t count;
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|     const keymaster_key_format_t* formats =
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|         context_->GetKeyFactory(request.algorithm)->SupportedImportFormats(&count);
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|     response->SetResults(formats, count);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::SupportedExportFormats(const SupportedExportFormatsRequest& request,
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|                                               SupportedExportFormatsResponse* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr || !check_supported(*context_, request.algorithm, response)) return;
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| 
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|     size_t count;
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|     const keymaster_key_format_t* formats =
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|         context_->GetKeyFactory(request.algorithm)->SupportedExportFormats(&count);
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|     response->SetResults(formats, count);
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| }
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| 
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| GetHmacSharingParametersResponse AndroidKeymaster::GetHmacSharingParameters() {
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|     GetHmacSharingParametersResponse response(message_version());
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|     KeymasterEnforcement* policy = context_->enforcement_policy();
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|     if (!policy) {
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|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
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|         return response;
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|     }
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| 
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|     response.error = policy->GetHmacSharingParameters(&response.params);
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|     return response;
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| }
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| 
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| ComputeSharedHmacResponse
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| AndroidKeymaster::ComputeSharedHmac(const ComputeSharedHmacRequest& request) {
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|     ComputeSharedHmacResponse response(message_version());
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|     KeymasterEnforcement* policy = context_->enforcement_policy();
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|     if (!policy) {
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|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
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|         return response;
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|     }
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|     response.error = policy->ComputeSharedHmac(request.params_array, &response.sharing_check);
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| 
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|     return response;
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| }
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| 
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| VerifyAuthorizationResponse
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| AndroidKeymaster::VerifyAuthorization(const VerifyAuthorizationRequest& request) {
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|     KeymasterEnforcement* policy = context_->enforcement_policy();
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|     if (!policy) {
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|         VerifyAuthorizationResponse response(message_version());
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|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
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|         return response;
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|     }
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| 
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|     return policy->VerifyAuthorization(request);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::GenerateTimestampToken(GenerateTimestampTokenRequest& request,
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|                                               GenerateTimestampTokenResponse* response) {
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|     KeymasterEnforcement* policy = context_->enforcement_policy();
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|     if (!policy) {
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|         response->error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
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|     } else {
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|         response->token.challenge = request.challenge;
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|         response->error = policy->GenerateTimestampToken(&response->token);
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|     }
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::AddRngEntropy(const AddEntropyRequest& request,
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|                                      AddEntropyResponse* response) {
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|     response->error = context_->AddRngEntropy(request.random_data.peek_read(),
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|                                               request.random_data.available_read());
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| }
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| 
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| const KeyFactory* get_key_factory(const AuthorizationSet& key_description,
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|                                   const KeymasterContext& context,  //
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|                                   keymaster_error_t* error) {
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|     keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm;
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|     const KeyFactory* factory{};
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|     if (!key_description.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM, &algorithm) ||
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|         !(factory = context.GetKeyFactory(algorithm))) {
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|         *error = KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM;
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|     }
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|     return factory;
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::GenerateKey(const GenerateKeyRequest& request,
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|                                    GenerateKeyResponse* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr) return;
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| 
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|     const KeyFactory* factory =
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|         get_key_factory(request.key_description, *context_, &response->error);
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|     if (!factory) return;
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| 
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|     UniquePtr<Key> attest_key;
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|     if (request.attestation_signing_key_blob.key_material_size) {
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|         attest_key = LoadKey(request.attestation_signing_key_blob, request.attest_key_params,
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|                              &response->error);
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|         if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     if (request.key_description.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY) &&
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|         request.key_description.GetTagCount(TAG_PURPOSE) > 1) {
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|         // ATTEST_KEY cannot be combined with any other purpose.
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|         response->error = KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     response->enforced.Clear();
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|     response->unenforced.Clear();
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|     response->error = factory->GenerateKey(request.key_description,
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|                                            move(attest_key),  //
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|                                            request.issuer_subject,
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|                                            &response->key_blob,  //
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|                                            &response->enforced,
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|                                            &response->unenforced,  //
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|                                            &response->certificate_chain);
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::GenerateRkpKey(const GenerateRkpKeyRequest& request,
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|                                       GenerateRkpKeyResponse* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr) return;
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| 
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|     auto rem_prov_ctx = context_->GetRemoteProvisioningContext();
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|     if (rem_prov_ctx == nullptr) {
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     // Generate the keypair that will become the attestation key.
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|     GenerateKeyRequest gen_key_request(message_version_);
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|     gen_key_request.key_description.Reinitialize(kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params,
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|                                                  array_length(kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params));
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|     GenerateKeyResponse gen_key_response(message_version_);
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|     GenerateKey(gen_key_request, &gen_key_response);
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|     if (gen_key_response.error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     // Retrieve the certificate and parse it to build a COSE_Key
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|     if (gen_key_response.certificate_chain.entry_count != 1) {
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|         // Error: Need the single non-signed certificate with the public key in it.
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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|     std::vector<uint8_t> x_coord(kP256AffinePointSize);
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|     std::vector<uint8_t> y_coord(kP256AffinePointSize);
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|     response->error =
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|         GetEcdsa256KeyFromCert(gen_key_response.certificate_chain.begin(), x_coord.data(),
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|                                x_coord.size(), y_coord.data(), y_coord.size());
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|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     cppbor::Map cose_public_key_map = cppbor::Map()
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|                                           .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, EC2)
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|                                           .add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, ES256)
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|                                           .add(CoseKey::CURVE, P256)
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|                                           .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, x_coord)
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|                                           .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_Y, y_coord);
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|     if (request.test_mode) {
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|         cose_public_key_map.add(CoseKey::TEST_KEY, cppbor::Null());
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|     }
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| 
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|     std::vector<uint8_t> cosePublicKey = cose_public_key_map.canonicalize().encode();
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| 
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|     auto macFunction = getMacFunction(request.test_mode, rem_prov_ctx);
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|     auto macedKey = constructCoseMac0(macFunction, {} /* externalAad */, cosePublicKey);
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|     if (!macedKey) {
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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|     std::vector<uint8_t> enc = macedKey->encode();
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|     response->maced_public_key = KeymasterBlob(enc.data(), enc.size());
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|     response->key_blob = std::move(gen_key_response.key_blob);
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|     response->error = KM_ERROR_OK;
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| }
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| 
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| void AndroidKeymaster::GenerateCsr(const GenerateCsrRequest& request,
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|                                    GenerateCsrResponse* response) {
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|     if (response == nullptr) return;
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| 
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|     auto rem_prov_ctx = context_->GetRemoteProvisioningContext();
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|     if (rem_prov_ctx == nullptr) {
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|         LOG_E("Couldn't get a pointer to the remote provisioning context, returned null.", 0);
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     auto macFunction = getMacFunction(request.test_mode, rem_prov_ctx);
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|     auto pubKeysToSign = validateAndExtractPubkeys(request.test_mode, request.num_keys,
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|                                                    request.keys_to_sign_array, macFunction);
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|     if (!pubKeysToSign.isOk()) {
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|         LOG_E("Failed to validate and extract the public keys for the CSR", 0);
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(pubKeysToSign.moveError());
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     std::vector<uint8_t> ephemeral_mac_key(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0 /* value */);
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|     if (GenerateRandom(ephemeral_mac_key.data(), ephemeral_mac_key.size()) != KM_ERROR_OK) {
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|         LOG_E("Failed to generate a random mac key.", 0);
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|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
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|         return;
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|     }
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| 
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|     auto ephemeral_mac_function = [&ephemeral_mac_key](const cppcose::bytevec& input) {
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|         return cppcose::generateHmacSha256(ephemeral_mac_key, input);
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|     };
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| 
 | |
|     auto pubKeysToSignMac =
 | |
|         generateCoseMac0Mac(ephemeral_mac_function, std::vector<uint8_t>{}, *pubKeysToSign);
 | |
|     if (!pubKeysToSignMac) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Failed to generate COSE_Mac0 over the public keys to sign.", 0);
 | |
|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
|     response->keys_to_sign_mac = KeymasterBlob(pubKeysToSignMac->data(), pubKeysToSignMac->size());
 | |
| 
 | |
|     std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> device_info_map = rem_prov_ctx->CreateDeviceInfo();
 | |
|     std::vector<uint8_t> device_info = device_info_map->encode();
 | |
|     response->device_info_blob = KeymasterBlob(device_info.data(), device_info.size());
 | |
|     auto protectedDataPayload = rem_prov_ctx->BuildProtectedDataPayload(
 | |
|         request.test_mode,  //
 | |
|         ephemeral_mac_key /* Payload */,
 | |
|         cppbor::Array() /* AAD */
 | |
|             .add(std::pair(request.challenge.begin(),
 | |
|                            request.challenge.end() - request.challenge.begin()))
 | |
|             .add(std::move(device_info_map))
 | |
|             .add(std::pair(pubKeysToSignMac->data(), pubKeysToSignMac->size()))
 | |
|             .encode());
 | |
|     if (!protectedDataPayload) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Failed to construct ProtectedData: %s", protectedDataPayload.moveMessage().c_str());
 | |
|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     std::vector<uint8_t> ephemeralPrivKey(X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
 | |
|     std::vector<uint8_t> ephemeralPubKey(X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
 | |
|     X25519_keypair(ephemeralPubKey.data(), ephemeralPrivKey.data());
 | |
| 
 | |
|     auto eek = validateAndExtractEekPubAndId(request.test_mode, request.endpoint_enc_cert_chain);
 | |
|     if (!eek.isOk()) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Failed to validate and extract the endpoint encryption key.", 0);
 | |
|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(eek.moveError());
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     auto sessionKey =
 | |
|         x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(ephemeralPubKey, ephemeralPrivKey, eek->first, true /* senderIsA */);
 | |
|     if (!sessionKey) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Failed to derive the session key.", 0);
 | |
|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     std::vector<uint8_t> nonce(kAesGcmNonceLength, 0 /* value */);
 | |
|     if (GenerateRandom(nonce.data(), nonce.size()) != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Failed to generate a random nonce.", 0);
 | |
|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
|     auto coseEncrypted = constructCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey,                       //
 | |
|                                               nonce,                             //
 | |
|                                               protectedDataPayload.moveValue(),  //
 | |
|                                               {},                                // aad
 | |
|                                               buildCertReqRecipients(ephemeralPubKey, eek->second));
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (!coseEncrypted) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Failed to construct a COSE_Encrypt ProtectedData structure", 0);
 | |
|         response->error = static_cast<keymaster_error_t>(kStatusFailed);
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
|     std::vector<uint8_t> payload = coseEncrypted->encode();
 | |
|     response->protected_data_blob = KeymasterBlob(payload.data(), payload.size());
 | |
|     response->error = KM_ERROR_OK;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::GetKeyCharacteristics(const GetKeyCharacteristicsRequest& request,
 | |
|                                              GetKeyCharacteristicsResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (response == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<Key> key;
 | |
|     response->error =
 | |
|         context_->ParseKeyBlob(KeymasterKeyBlob(request.key_blob), request.additional_params, &key);
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     // scavenge the key object for the auth lists
 | |
|     response->enforced = move(key->hw_enforced());
 | |
|     response->unenforced = move(key->sw_enforced());
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = CheckVersionInfo(response->enforced, response->unenforced, *context_);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::BeginOperation(const BeginOperationRequest& request,
 | |
|                                       BeginOperationResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (response == nullptr) return;
 | |
|     response->op_handle = 0;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<Key> key = LoadKey(request.key_blob, request.additional_params, &response->error);
 | |
|     if (!key) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
 | |
|     keymaster_algorithm_t key_algorithm;
 | |
|     if (!key->authorizations().GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM, &key_algorithm)) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_PURPOSE;
 | |
|     OperationFactory* factory = key->key_factory()->GetOperationFactory(request.purpose);
 | |
|     if (!factory) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     uint32_t sd_slot = key->secure_deletion_slot();
 | |
| 
 | |
|     OperationPtr operation(
 | |
|         factory->CreateOperation(move(*key), request.additional_params, &response->error));
 | |
|     if (operation.get() == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     operation->set_secure_deletion_slot(sd_slot);
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (operation->authorizations().Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)) {
 | |
|         if (!operation->create_confirmation_verifier_buffer()) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (context_->enforcement_policy()) {
 | |
|         km_id_t key_id;
 | |
|         response->error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
 | |
|         if (!context_->enforcement_policy()->CreateKeyId(request.key_blob, &key_id)) return;
 | |
|         operation->set_key_id(key_id);
 | |
|         response->error = context_->enforcement_policy()->AuthorizeOperation(
 | |
|             request.purpose, key_id, operation->authorizations(), request.additional_params,
 | |
|             0 /* op_handle */, true /* is_begin_operation */);
 | |
|         if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->output_params.Clear();
 | |
|     response->error = operation->Begin(request.additional_params, &response->output_params);
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->op_handle = operation->operation_handle();
 | |
|     response->error = operation_table_->Add(move(operation));
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::UpdateOperation(const UpdateOperationRequest& request,
 | |
|                                        UpdateOperationResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (response == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE;
 | |
|     Operation* operation = operation_table_->Find(request.op_handle);
 | |
|     if (operation == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     Buffer* confirmation_verifier_buffer = operation->get_confirmation_verifier_buffer();
 | |
|     if (confirmation_verifier_buffer != nullptr) {
 | |
|         size_t input_num_bytes = request.input.available_read();
 | |
|         if (input_num_bytes + confirmation_verifier_buffer->available_read() >
 | |
|             kConfirmationMessageMaxSize + kConfirmationTokenMessageTagSize) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 | |
|             operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         if (!confirmation_verifier_buffer->reserve(input_num_bytes)) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
 | |
|             operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         confirmation_verifier_buffer->write(request.input.peek_read(), input_num_bytes);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (context_->enforcement_policy()) {
 | |
|         response->error = context_->enforcement_policy()->AuthorizeOperation(
 | |
|             operation->purpose(), operation->key_id(), operation->authorizations(),
 | |
|             request.additional_params, request.op_handle, false /* is_begin_operation */);
 | |
|         if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|             operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error =
 | |
|         operation->Update(request.additional_params, request.input, &response->output_params,
 | |
|                           &response->output, &response->input_consumed);
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|         // Any error invalidates the operation.
 | |
|         operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::FinishOperation(const FinishOperationRequest& request,
 | |
|                                        FinishOperationResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (response == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE;
 | |
|     Operation* operation = operation_table_->Find(request.op_handle);
 | |
|     if (operation == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     Buffer* confirmation_verifier_buffer = operation->get_confirmation_verifier_buffer();
 | |
|     if (confirmation_verifier_buffer != nullptr) {
 | |
|         size_t input_num_bytes = request.input.available_read();
 | |
|         if (input_num_bytes + confirmation_verifier_buffer->available_read() >
 | |
|             kConfirmationMessageMaxSize + kConfirmationTokenMessageTagSize) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 | |
|             operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         if (!confirmation_verifier_buffer->reserve(input_num_bytes)) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
 | |
|             operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         confirmation_verifier_buffer->write(request.input.peek_read(), input_num_bytes);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (context_->enforcement_policy()) {
 | |
|         response->error = context_->enforcement_policy()->AuthorizeOperation(
 | |
|             operation->purpose(), operation->key_id(), operation->authorizations(),
 | |
|             request.additional_params, request.op_handle, false /* is_begin_operation */);
 | |
|         if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|             operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = operation->Finish(request.additional_params, request.input, request.signature,
 | |
|                                         &response->output_params, &response->output);
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|         operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     // Invalidate the single use key from secure storage after finish.
 | |
|     if (operation->hw_enforced().Contains(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)) {
 | |
|         if (context_->secure_deletion_secret_storage() != nullptr) {
 | |
|             context_->secure_deletion_secret_storage()->DeleteKey(
 | |
|                 operation->secure_deletion_slot());
 | |
|         } else if (context_->secure_key_storage() != nullptr) {
 | |
|             context_->secure_key_storage()->DeleteKey(operation->key_id());
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     // If the operation succeeded and TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED was
 | |
|     // set, the input must be checked against the confirmation token.
 | |
|     if (response->error == KM_ERROR_OK && confirmation_verifier_buffer != nullptr) {
 | |
|         keymaster_blob_t confirmation_token_blob;
 | |
|         if (!request.additional_params.GetTagValue(TAG_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN,
 | |
|                                                    &confirmation_token_blob)) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_NO_USER_CONFIRMATION;
 | |
|             response->output.Clear();
 | |
|         } else {
 | |
|             if (confirmation_token_blob.data_length != kConfirmationTokenSize) {
 | |
|                 LOG_E("TAG_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN wrong size, was %zd expected %zd",
 | |
|                       confirmation_token_blob.data_length, kConfirmationTokenSize);
 | |
|                 response->error = KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 | |
|                 response->output.Clear();
 | |
|             } else {
 | |
|                 keymaster_error_t verification_result = context_->CheckConfirmationToken(
 | |
|                     confirmation_verifier_buffer->begin(),
 | |
|                     confirmation_verifier_buffer->available_read(), confirmation_token_blob.data);
 | |
|                 if (verification_result != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|                     response->error = verification_result;
 | |
|                     response->output.Clear();
 | |
|                 }
 | |
|             }
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::AbortOperation(const AbortOperationRequest& request,
 | |
|                                       AbortOperationResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     Operation* operation = operation_table_->Find(request.op_handle);
 | |
|     if (!operation) {
 | |
|         response->error = KM_ERROR_INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE;
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = operation->Abort();
 | |
|     operation_table_->Delete(request.op_handle);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::ExportKey(const ExportKeyRequest& request, ExportKeyResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (response == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<Key> key;
 | |
|     response->error =
 | |
|         context_->ParseKeyBlob(KeymasterKeyBlob(request.key_blob), request.additional_params, &key);
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<uint8_t[]> out_key;
 | |
|     size_t size;
 | |
|     response->error = key->formatted_key_material(request.key_format, &out_key, &size);
 | |
|     if (response->error == KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|         response->key_data = out_key.release();
 | |
|         response->key_data_length = size;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::AttestKey(const AttestKeyRequest& request, AttestKeyResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<Key> key = LoadKey(request.key_blob, request.attest_params, &response->error);
 | |
|     if (!key) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     keymaster_blob_t attestation_application_id;
 | |
|     if (request.attest_params.GetTagValue(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
 | |
|                                           &attestation_application_id)) {
 | |
|         key->sw_enforced().push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, attestation_application_id);
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->certificate_chain =
 | |
|         context_->GenerateAttestation(*key, request.attest_params, {} /* attestation_signing_key */,
 | |
|                                       {} /* issuer_subject */, &response->error);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::UpgradeKey(const UpgradeKeyRequest& request, UpgradeKeyResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     KeymasterKeyBlob upgraded_key;
 | |
|     response->error = context_->UpgradeKeyBlob(KeymasterKeyBlob(request.key_blob),
 | |
|                                                request.upgrade_params, &upgraded_key);
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
 | |
|     response->upgraded_key = upgraded_key.release();
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::ImportKey(const ImportKeyRequest& request, ImportKeyResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (response == nullptr) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     const KeyFactory* factory =
 | |
|         get_key_factory(request.key_description, *context_, &response->error);
 | |
|     if (!factory) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (context_->enforcement_policy() &&
 | |
|         request.key_description.GetTagValue(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY) &&
 | |
|         !context_->enforcement_policy()->in_early_boot()) {
 | |
|         response->error = KM_ERROR_EARLY_BOOT_ENDED;
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<Key> attest_key;
 | |
|     if (request.attestation_signing_key_blob.key_material_size) {
 | |
| 
 | |
|         attest_key =
 | |
|             LoadKey(request.attestation_signing_key_blob, {} /* params */, &response->error);
 | |
|         if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (request.key_description.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY) &&
 | |
|         request.key_description.GetTagCount(TAG_PURPOSE) > 1) {
 | |
|         // ATTEST_KEY cannot be combined with any other purpose.
 | |
|         response->error = KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE;
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = factory->ImportKey(request.key_description,  //
 | |
|                                          request.key_format,       //
 | |
|                                          request.key_data,         //
 | |
|                                          move(attest_key),         //
 | |
|                                          request.issuer_subject,   //
 | |
|                                          &response->key_blob,      //
 | |
|                                          &response->enforced,      //
 | |
|                                          &response->unenforced,    //
 | |
|                                          &response->certificate_chain);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::DeleteKey(const DeleteKeyRequest& request, DeleteKeyResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
|     response->error = context_->DeleteKey(KeymasterKeyBlob(request.key_blob));
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::DeleteAllKeys(const DeleteAllKeysRequest&, DeleteAllKeysResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
|     response->error = context_->DeleteAllKeys();
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::Configure(const ConfigureRequest& request, ConfigureResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
|     response->error = context_->SetSystemVersion(request.os_version, request.os_patchlevel);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ConfigureVendorPatchlevelResponse
 | |
| AndroidKeymaster::ConfigureVendorPatchlevel(const ConfigureVendorPatchlevelRequest& request) {
 | |
|     ConfigureVendorPatchlevelResponse rsp(message_version());
 | |
|     rsp.error = context_->SetVendorPatchlevel(request.vendor_patchlevel);
 | |
|     return rsp;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ConfigureBootPatchlevelResponse
 | |
| AndroidKeymaster::ConfigureBootPatchlevel(const ConfigureBootPatchlevelRequest& request) {
 | |
|     ConfigureBootPatchlevelResponse rsp(message_version());
 | |
|     rsp.error = context_->SetBootPatchlevel(request.boot_patchlevel);
 | |
|     return rsp;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| ConfigureVerifiedBootInfoResponse
 | |
| AndroidKeymaster::ConfigureVerifiedBootInfo(const ConfigureVerifiedBootInfoRequest& request) {
 | |
|     ConfigureVerifiedBootInfoResponse rsp(message_version());
 | |
|     rsp.error = context_->SetVerifiedBootInfo(request.boot_state, request.bootloader_state,
 | |
|                                               request.vbmeta_digest);
 | |
|     return rsp;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| bool AndroidKeymaster::has_operation(keymaster_operation_handle_t op_handle) const {
 | |
|     return operation_table_->Find(op_handle) != nullptr;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| UniquePtr<Key> AndroidKeymaster::LoadKey(const keymaster_key_blob_t& key_blob,
 | |
|                                          const AuthorizationSet& additional_params,
 | |
|                                          keymaster_error_t* error) {
 | |
|     if (!error) return {};
 | |
| 
 | |
|     UniquePtr<Key> key;
 | |
|     KeymasterKeyBlob key_material;
 | |
|     *error = context_->ParseKeyBlob(KeymasterKeyBlob(key_blob), additional_params, &key);
 | |
|     if (*error != KM_ERROR_OK) return {};
 | |
| 
 | |
|     *error = CheckVersionInfo(key->hw_enforced(), key->sw_enforced(), *context_);
 | |
|     if (*error != KM_ERROR_OK) return {};
 | |
| 
 | |
|     return key;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| void AndroidKeymaster::ImportWrappedKey(const ImportWrappedKeyRequest& request,
 | |
|                                         ImportWrappedKeyResponse* response) {
 | |
|     if (!response) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     KeymasterKeyBlob secret_key;
 | |
|     AuthorizationSet key_description;
 | |
|     keymaster_key_format_t key_format;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error =
 | |
|         context_->UnwrapKey(request.wrapped_key, request.wrapping_key, request.additional_params,
 | |
|                             request.masking_key, &key_description, &key_format, &secret_key);
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (response->error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|         return;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     int sid_idx = key_description.find(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID);
 | |
|     if (sid_idx != -1) {
 | |
|         uint8_t sids = key_description[sid_idx].long_integer;
 | |
|         if (!key_description.erase(sid_idx)) {
 | |
|             response->error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
 | |
|             return;
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         if (sids & HW_AUTH_PASSWORD) {
 | |
|             key_description.push_back(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, request.password_sid);
 | |
|         }
 | |
|         if (sids & HW_AUTH_FINGERPRINT) {
 | |
|             key_description.push_back(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, request.biometric_sid);
 | |
|         }
 | |
| 
 | |
|         if (context_->GetKmVersion() >= KmVersion::KEYMINT_1) {
 | |
|             key_description.push_back(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, 0);
 | |
|             key_description.push_back(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, kUndefinedExpirationDateTime);
 | |
|         }
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     const KeyFactory* factory = get_key_factory(key_description, *context_, &response->error);
 | |
|     if (!factory) return;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     response->error = factory->ImportKey(key_description,          //
 | |
|                                          key_format,               //
 | |
|                                          secret_key,               //
 | |
|                                          {} /* attest_key */,      //
 | |
|                                          {} /* issuer_subject */,  //
 | |
|                                          &response->key_blob,      //
 | |
|                                          &response->enforced,      //
 | |
|                                          &response->unenforced,    //
 | |
|                                          &response->certificate_chain);
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| EarlyBootEndedResponse AndroidKeymaster::EarlyBootEnded() {
 | |
|     EarlyBootEndedResponse response(message_version());
 | |
|     response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (context_->enforcement_policy()) {
 | |
|         context_->enforcement_policy()->early_boot_ended();
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_OK;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     return response;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| DeviceLockedResponse AndroidKeymaster::DeviceLocked(const DeviceLockedRequest& request) {
 | |
|     DeviceLockedResponse response(message_version());
 | |
|     response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (context_->enforcement_policy()) {
 | |
|         context_->enforcement_policy()->device_locked(request.passwordOnly);
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_OK;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     return response;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| GetRootOfTrustResponse AndroidKeymaster::GetRootOfTrust(const GetRootOfTrustRequest& request) {
 | |
|     GetRootOfTrustResponse response(message_version());
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (!context_->attestation_context()) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Have no attestation context, cannot get RootOfTrust", 0);
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
 | |
|         return response;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     const AttestationContext::VerifiedBootParams* vbParams =
 | |
|         context_->attestation_context()->GetVerifiedBootParams(&response.error);
 | |
|     if (response.error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Error retrieving verified boot params: %lu", response.error);
 | |
|         return response;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     auto boot_patch_level = context_->GetBootPatchlevel();
 | |
|     if (!boot_patch_level) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Error retrieving boot patch level: %lu", response.error);
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
 | |
|         return response;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (!context_->enforcement_policy()) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Have no enforcement policy, cannot get RootOfTrust", 0);
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
 | |
|         return response;
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     auto macFunction =
 | |
|         [&](const std::vector<uint8_t>& data) -> cppcose::ErrMsgOr<cppcose::HmacSha256> {
 | |
|         auto mac = context_->enforcement_policy()->ComputeHmac(data);
 | |
|         if (!mac) return "Failed to compute HMAC";
 | |
|         return *std::move(mac);
 | |
|     };
 | |
| 
 | |
|     auto maced_root_of_trust = cppcose::constructCoseMac0(
 | |
|         macFunction,  //
 | |
|         request.challenge,
 | |
|         cppbor::SemanticTag(kRoTVersion1, cppbor::Array(                                //
 | |
|                                               blob2Pair(vbParams->verified_boot_key),   //
 | |
|                                               vbParams->device_locked,                  //
 | |
|                                               vbParams->verified_boot_state,            //
 | |
|                                               blob2Pair(vbParams->verified_boot_hash),  //
 | |
|                                               *boot_patch_level))
 | |
|             .encode());
 | |
| 
 | |
|     if (!maced_root_of_trust) {
 | |
|         LOG_E("Error MACing RoT: %s", maced_root_of_trust.message().c_str());
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
 | |
|     } else {
 | |
|         response.error = KM_ERROR_OK;
 | |
|         response.rootOfTrust =
 | |
|             cppbor::SemanticTag(cppcose::kCoseMac0SemanticTag, *std::move(maced_root_of_trust))
 | |
|                 .encode();
 | |
|     }
 | |
| 
 | |
|     return response;
 | |
| }
 | |
| 
 | |
| }  // namespace keymaster
 |