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android13/system/keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.cpp

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/*
* Copyright 2016 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_record.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <math.h>
#include <unordered_map>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h>
#include <keymaster/attestation_context.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/hmac.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/openssl_err.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/openssl_utils.h>
#define ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(stmt, error) \
do { \
assert(stmt); \
if (!(stmt)) { \
return error; \
} \
} while (0)
namespace keymaster {
constexpr size_t kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength = 128;
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION);
static const keymaster_tag_t kDeviceAttestationTags[] = {
KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT,
KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID,
KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL,
};
struct KM_AUTH_LIST_Delete {
void operator()(KM_AUTH_LIST* p) { KM_AUTH_LIST_free(p); }
};
struct KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Delete {
void operator()(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION* p) { KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_free(p); }
};
struct KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST_Delete {
void operator()(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* p) { KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST_free(p); }
};
static cppbor::Bstr blob_to_bstr(const keymaster_blob_t& blob) {
return cppbor::Bstr(std::pair(blob.data, blob.data_length));
}
static keymaster_error_t bstr_to_blob(const cppbor::Bstr* bstr, keymaster_blob_t* blob) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(bstr, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
const std::vector<uint8_t>& vec = bstr->value();
uint8_t* data = (uint8_t*)calloc(vec.size(), sizeof(uint8_t));
if (data == nullptr) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
std::copy(vec.begin(), vec.end(), data);
blob->data = data;
blob->data_length = vec.size();
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
static uint32_t get_uint32_value(const keymaster_key_param_t& param) {
switch (keymaster_tag_get_type(param.tag)) {
case KM_ENUM:
case KM_ENUM_REP:
return param.enumerated;
case KM_UINT:
case KM_UINT_REP:
return param.integer;
default:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(false, 0xFFFFFFFF);
}
}
static int64_t get_uint32_value(EatSecurityLevel level) {
return static_cast<int64_t>(level);
}
// Insert value in either the dest_integer or the dest_integer_set, whichever is provided.
static keymaster_error_t insert_integer(ASN1_INTEGER* value, ASN1_INTEGER** dest_integer,
ASN1_INTEGER_SET** dest_integer_set) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR((dest_integer == nullptr) ^ (dest_integer_set == nullptr),
KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value, KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
if (dest_integer_set) {
if (!*dest_integer_set) {
*dest_integer_set = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_new_null();
}
if (!*dest_integer_set) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
if (!sk_ASN1_INTEGER_push(*dest_integer_set, value)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
} else if (dest_integer) {
if (*dest_integer) {
ASN1_INTEGER_free(*dest_integer);
}
*dest_integer = value;
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(false, KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR); // Should never get here.
}
// Add a repeating enum to a map going mapping its key to list of values.
static void add_repeating_enum(EatClaim key, uint32_t value,
std::unordered_map<EatClaim, cppbor::Array>* fields_map) {
auto field = fields_map->find(key);
if (field != fields_map->end()) {
field->second.add(value);
} else {
fields_map->insert({key, cppbor::Array().add(value)});
}
}
static keymaster_error_t
insert_unknown_tag(const keymaster_key_param_t& param, cppbor::Map* dest_map,
std::unordered_map<EatClaim, cppbor::Array>* fields_map) {
EatClaim private_eat_tag = static_cast<EatClaim>(convert_to_eat_claim(param.tag));
switch (keymaster_tag_get_type(param.tag)) {
case KM_ENUM:
dest_map->add(private_eat_tag, param.enumerated);
break;
case KM_ENUM_REP:
add_repeating_enum(private_eat_tag, param.enumerated, fields_map);
break;
case KM_UINT:
dest_map->add(private_eat_tag, param.integer);
break;
case KM_UINT_REP:
add_repeating_enum(private_eat_tag, param.integer, fields_map);
break;
case KM_ULONG:
dest_map->add(private_eat_tag, param.long_integer);
break;
case KM_ULONG_REP:
add_repeating_enum(private_eat_tag, param.long_integer, fields_map);
break;
case KM_DATE:
dest_map->add(private_eat_tag, param.date_time);
break;
case KM_BOOL:
dest_map->add(private_eat_tag, true);
break;
case KM_BIGNUM:
case KM_BYTES:
dest_map->add(private_eat_tag, blob_to_bstr(param.blob));
break;
default:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(false, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
/**
* Convert an IMEI encoded as a string of numbers into the UEID format defined in
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-rats-eat.
* The resulting format is a bstr encoded as follows:
* - Type byte: 0x03
* - IMEI (without check digit), encoded as byte string of length 14 with each byte as the digit's
* value. The IMEI value encoded SHALL NOT include Luhn checksum or SVN information.
*/
keymaster_error_t imei_to_ueid(const keymaster_blob_t& imei_blob, cppbor::Bstr* out) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(imei_blob.data_length == kImeiBlobLength, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
uint8_t ueid[kUeidLength];
ueid[0] = kImeiTypeByte;
// imei_blob corresponds to android.telephony.TelephonyManager#getDeviceId(), which is the
// 15-digit IMEI (including the check digit), encoded as a string.
for (size_t i = 1; i < kUeidLength; i++) {
// Convert each character to its numeric value.
ueid[i] = imei_blob.data[i - 1] - '0'; // Intentionally skip check digit at last position.
}
*out = cppbor::Bstr(std::pair(ueid, sizeof(ueid)));
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t ueid_to_imei_blob(const cppbor::Bstr* ueid, keymaster_blob_t* out) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(ueid, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
const std::vector<uint8_t>& ueid_vec = ueid->value();
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(ueid_vec.size() == kUeidLength, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(ueid_vec[0] == kImeiTypeByte, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
uint8_t* imei_string = (uint8_t*)calloc(kImeiBlobLength, sizeof(uint8_t));
// Fill string from left to right, and calculate Luhn check digit.
int luhn_digit_sum = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < kImeiBlobLength - 1; i++) {
uint8_t digit_i = ueid_vec[i + 1];
// Convert digit to its string value.
imei_string[i] = '0' + digit_i;
luhn_digit_sum += i % 2 == 0 ? digit_i : digit_i * 2 / 10 + (digit_i * 2) % 10;
}
imei_string[kImeiBlobLength - 1] = '0' + (10 - luhn_digit_sum % 10) % 10;
*out = {.data = imei_string, .data_length = kImeiBlobLength};
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t ec_key_size_to_eat_curve(uint32_t key_size_bits, int* curve) {
switch (key_size_bits) {
default:
return KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE;
case 224:
*curve = (int)EatEcCurve::P_224;
break;
case 256:
*curve = (int)EatEcCurve::P_256;
break;
case 384:
*curve = (int)EatEcCurve::P_384;
break;
case 521:
*curve = (int)EatEcCurve::P_521;
break;
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
bool is_valid_attestation_challenge(const keymaster_blob_t& attestation_challenge) {
// TODO(171864369): Limit apps targeting >= API 30 to attestations in the range of
// [0, 128] bytes.
return (attestation_challenge.data_length <= kMaximumAttestationChallengeLength);
}
// Put the contents of the keymaster AuthorizationSet auth_list into the EAT record structure.
keymaster_error_t build_eat_submod(const AuthorizationSet& auth_list,
const EatSecurityLevel security_level, cppbor::Map* submod) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(submod, KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
if (auth_list.empty()) return KM_ERROR_OK;
submod->add(EatClaim::SECURITY_LEVEL, get_uint32_value(security_level));
// Keep repeating fields in a separate map for easy lookup.
// Add them to submod map in postprocessing.
std::unordered_map<EatClaim, cppbor::Array> repeating_fields =
std::unordered_map<EatClaim, cppbor::Array>();
for (auto entry : auth_list) {
switch (entry.tag) {
default:
// Unknown tags should only be included if they're software-enforced.
if (security_level == EatSecurityLevel::UNRESTRICTED) {
keymaster_error_t error = insert_unknown_tag(entry, submod, &repeating_fields);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
return error;
}
}
break;
/* Tags ignored because they should never exist */
case KM_TAG_INVALID:
/* Tags ignored because they're not used. */
case KM_TAG_ALL_USERS:
case KM_TAG_EXPORTABLE:
case KM_TAG_ECIES_SINGLE_HASH_MODE:
case KM_TAG_KDF:
/* Tags ignored because they're used only to provide information to operations */
case KM_TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA:
case KM_TAG_NONCE:
case KM_TAG_AUTH_TOKEN:
case KM_TAG_MAC_LENGTH:
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE:
case KM_TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION:
/* Tags ignored because they have no meaning off-device */
case KM_TAG_USER_ID:
case KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID:
case KM_TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS:
/* Tags ignored because they're not usable by app keys */
case KM_TAG_BOOTLOADER_ONLY:
case KM_TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID:
case KM_TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT:
case KM_TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS:
case KM_TAG_UNIQUE_ID:
/* Tags ignored because they contain data that should not be exported */
case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_DATA:
case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_ID:
case KM_TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST:
continue;
/* Non-repeating enumerations */
case KM_TAG_ALGORITHM:
submod->add(EatClaim::ALGORITHM, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_EC_CURVE:
submod->add(EatClaim::EC_CURVE, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE:
submod->add(EatClaim::USER_AUTH_TYPE, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_ORIGIN:
submod->add(EatClaim::ORIGIN, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
/* Repeating enumerations */
case KM_TAG_PURPOSE:
add_repeating_enum(EatClaim::PURPOSE, get_uint32_value(entry), &repeating_fields);
break;
case KM_TAG_PADDING:
add_repeating_enum(EatClaim::PADDING, get_uint32_value(entry), &repeating_fields);
break;
case KM_TAG_DIGEST:
add_repeating_enum(EatClaim::DIGEST, get_uint32_value(entry), &repeating_fields);
break;
case KM_TAG_BLOCK_MODE:
add_repeating_enum(EatClaim::BLOCK_MODE, get_uint32_value(entry), &repeating_fields);
break;
/* Non-repeating unsigned integers */
case KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE:
submod->add(EatClaim::KEY_SIZE, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT:
submod->add(EatClaim::AUTH_TIMEOUT, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_OS_VERSION:
submod->add(EatClaim::OS_VERSION, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL:
submod->add(EatClaim::OS_PATCHLEVEL, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL:
submod->add(EatClaim::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL:
submod->add(EatClaim::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
case KM_TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
submod->add(EatClaim::MIN_MAC_LENGTH, get_uint32_value(entry));
break;
/* Non-repeating long unsigned integers */
case KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
submod->add(EatClaim::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, entry.long_integer);
break;
/* Dates */
case KM_TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME:
submod->add(EatClaim::ACTIVE_DATETIME, entry.date_time);
break;
case KM_TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
submod->add(EatClaim::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, entry.date_time);
break;
case KM_TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
submod->add(EatClaim::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, entry.date_time);
break;
case KM_TAG_CREATION_DATETIME:
submod->add(EatClaim::IAT, entry.date_time);
break;
/* Booleans */
case KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
submod->add(EatClaim::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_ALL_APPLICATIONS:
submod->add(EatClaim::ALL_APPLICATIONS, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT:
submod->add(EatClaim::ROLLBACK_RESISTANT, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
submod->add(EatClaim::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED:
submod->add(EatClaim::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_CALLER_NONCE:
submod->add(EatClaim::CALLER_NONCE, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED:
submod->add(EatClaim::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY:
submod->add(EatClaim::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION:
submod->add(EatClaim::DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY:
submod->add(EatClaim::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:
submod->add(EatClaim::TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED, true);
break;
case KM_TAG_STORAGE_KEY:
submod->add(EatClaim::STORAGE_KEY, true);
break;
/* Byte arrays*/
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI: {
cppbor::Bstr ueid("");
keymaster_error_t error = imei_to_ueid(entry.blob, &ueid);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
submod->add(EatClaim::UEID, ueid);
break;
}
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
submod->add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
case KM_TAG_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN:
submod->add(EatClaim::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, blob_to_bstr(entry.blob));
break;
}
}
// Move values from repeating enums into the submod map.
for (auto const& repeating_field : repeating_fields) {
EatClaim key = static_cast<EatClaim>(repeating_field.first);
submod->add(key, std::move(repeating_fields.at(key)));
}
int ec_curve;
uint32_t key_size;
if (auth_list.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_EC) && !auth_list.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) &&
auth_list.GetTagValue(TAG_KEY_SIZE, &key_size)) {
// This must be a keymaster1 key. It's an EC key with no curve. Insert the curve.
keymaster_error_t error = ec_key_size_to_eat_curve(key_size, &ec_curve);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
submod->add(EatClaim::EC_CURVE, ec_curve);
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
// Put the contents of the keymaster AuthorizationSet auth_list into the ASN.1 record structure,
// record.
keymaster_error_t build_auth_list(const AuthorizationSet& auth_list, KM_AUTH_LIST* record) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(record, KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
if (auth_list.empty()) return KM_ERROR_OK;
for (auto entry : auth_list) {
ASN1_INTEGER_SET** integer_set = nullptr;
ASN1_INTEGER** integer_ptr = nullptr;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING** string_ptr = nullptr;
ASN1_NULL** bool_ptr = nullptr;
switch (entry.tag) {
/* Tags ignored because they should never exist */
case KM_TAG_INVALID:
/* Tags ignored because they're not used. */
case KM_TAG_ALL_USERS:
case KM_TAG_EXPORTABLE:
case KM_TAG_ECIES_SINGLE_HASH_MODE:
/* Tags ignored because they're used only to provide information to operations */
case KM_TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA:
case KM_TAG_NONCE:
case KM_TAG_AUTH_TOKEN:
case KM_TAG_MAC_LENGTH:
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE:
case KM_TAG_KDF:
/* Tags ignored because they're used only to provide for certificate generation */
case KM_TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL:
case KM_TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT:
case KM_TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE:
case KM_TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER:
case KM_TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID:
case KM_TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION:
/* Tags ignored because they have no meaning off-device */
case KM_TAG_USER_ID:
case KM_TAG_USER_SECURE_ID:
case KM_TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS:
/* Tags ignored because they're not usable by app keys */
case KM_TAG_BOOTLOADER_ONLY:
case KM_TAG_MAX_BOOT_LEVEL:
case KM_TAG_MAX_USES_PER_BOOT:
case KM_TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS:
case KM_TAG_STORAGE_KEY:
case KM_TAG_UNIQUE_ID:
/* Tags ignored because they contain data that should not be exported */
case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_DATA:
case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_ID:
case KM_TAG_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN:
case KM_TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST:
continue;
/* Non-repeating enumerations */
case KM_TAG_ALGORITHM:
integer_ptr = &record->algorithm;
break;
case KM_TAG_EC_CURVE:
integer_ptr = &record->ec_curve;
break;
case KM_TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE:
integer_ptr = &record->user_auth_type;
break;
case KM_TAG_ORIGIN:
integer_ptr = &record->origin;
break;
/* Repeating enumerations */
case KM_TAG_PURPOSE:
integer_set = &record->purpose;
break;
case KM_TAG_PADDING:
integer_set = &record->padding;
break;
case KM_TAG_DIGEST:
integer_set = &record->digest;
break;
case KM_TAG_BLOCK_MODE:
integer_set = &record->block_mode;
break;
case KM_TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST:
integer_set = &record->mgf_digest;
break;
/* Non-repeating unsigned integers */
case KM_TAG_KEY_SIZE:
integer_ptr = &record->key_size;
break;
case KM_TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT:
integer_ptr = &record->auth_timeout;
break;
case KM_TAG_OS_VERSION:
integer_ptr = &record->os_version;
break;
case KM_TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL:
integer_ptr = &record->os_patchlevel;
break;
case KM_TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
integer_ptr = &record->min_mac_length;
break;
case KM_TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL:
integer_ptr = &record->boot_patch_level;
break;
case KM_TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL:
integer_ptr = &record->vendor_patchlevel;
break;
case KM_TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT:
integer_ptr = &record->usage_count_limit;
break;
/* Non-repeating long unsigned integers */
case KM_TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
integer_ptr = &record->rsa_public_exponent;
break;
/* Dates */
case KM_TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME:
integer_ptr = &record->active_date_time;
break;
case KM_TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
integer_ptr = &record->origination_expire_date_time;
break;
case KM_TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
integer_ptr = &record->usage_expire_date_time;
break;
case KM_TAG_CREATION_DATETIME:
integer_ptr = &record->creation_date_time;
break;
/* Booleans */
case KM_TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
bool_ptr = &record->no_auth_required;
break;
case KM_TAG_ALL_APPLICATIONS:
bool_ptr = &record->all_applications;
break;
case KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT:
bool_ptr = &record->rollback_resistant;
break;
case KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE:
bool_ptr = &record->rollback_resistance;
break;
case KM_TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
bool_ptr = &record->allow_while_on_body;
break;
case KM_TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED:
bool_ptr = &record->unlocked_device_required;
break;
case KM_TAG_CALLER_NONCE:
bool_ptr = &record->caller_nonce;
break;
case KM_TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED:
bool_ptr = &record->trusted_confirmation_required;
break;
case KM_TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY:
bool_ptr = &record->early_boot_only;
break;
case KM_TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION:
bool_ptr = &record->device_unique_attestation;
break;
case KM_TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY:
bool_ptr = &record->identity_credential_key;
break;
case KM_TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:
bool_ptr = &record->trusted_user_presence_required;
break;
/* Byte arrays*/
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_application_id;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_brand;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_device;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_product;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_serial;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_imei;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_meid;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_manufacturer;
break;
case KM_TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
string_ptr = &record->attestation_id_model;
break;
}
keymaster_tag_type_t type = keymaster_tag_get_type(entry.tag);
switch (type) {
case KM_ENUM:
case KM_ENUM_REP:
case KM_UINT:
case KM_UINT_REP: {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR((keymaster_tag_repeatable(entry.tag) && integer_set) ||
(!keymaster_tag_repeatable(entry.tag) && integer_ptr),
KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_INTEGER_Delete> value(ASN1_INTEGER_new());
if (!value.get()) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(value.get(), get_uint32_value(entry))) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
insert_integer(value.release(), integer_ptr, integer_set);
break;
}
case KM_ULONG:
case KM_ULONG_REP:
case KM_DATE: {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR((keymaster_tag_repeatable(entry.tag) && integer_set) ||
(!keymaster_tag_repeatable(entry.tag) && integer_ptr),
KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
UniquePtr<BIGNUM, BIGNUM_Delete> bn_value(BN_new());
if (!bn_value.get()) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
if (type == KM_DATE) {
if (!BN_set_u64(bn_value.get(), entry.date_time)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
} else {
if (!BN_set_u64(bn_value.get(), entry.long_integer)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
}
UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_INTEGER_Delete> value(
BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn_value.get(), nullptr));
if (!value.get()) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
insert_integer(value.release(), integer_ptr, integer_set);
break;
}
case KM_BOOL:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(bool_ptr, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
if (!*bool_ptr) *bool_ptr = ASN1_NULL_new();
if (!*bool_ptr) return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
break;
/* Byte arrays*/
case KM_BYTES:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(string_ptr, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
if (!*string_ptr) {
*string_ptr = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
}
if (!*string_ptr) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(*string_ptr, entry.blob.data, entry.blob.data_length)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
break;
default:
return KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
}
}
keymaster_ec_curve_t ec_curve;
uint32_t key_size;
if (auth_list.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_EC) && //
!auth_list.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) && //
auth_list.GetTagValue(TAG_KEY_SIZE, &key_size)) {
// This must be a keymaster1 key. It's an EC key with no curve. Insert the curve if we
// can unambiguously figure it out.
keymaster_error_t error = EcKeySizeToCurve(key_size, &ec_curve);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_INTEGER_Delete> value(ASN1_INTEGER_new());
if (!value.get()) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(value.get(), ec_curve)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
insert_integer(value.release(), &record->ec_curve, nullptr);
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
// Construct a CBOR-encoded attestation record containing the values from sw_enforced
// and tee_enforced.
keymaster_error_t build_eat_record(const AuthorizationSet& attestation_params,
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced, AuthorizationSet tee_enforced,
const AttestationContext& context,
std::vector<uint8_t>* eat_token) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(eat_token, KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
cppbor::Map eat_record;
switch (context.GetSecurityLevel()) {
case KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE:
eat_record.add(EatClaim::SECURITY_LEVEL, get_uint32_value(EatSecurityLevel::UNRESTRICTED));
break;
case KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
eat_record.add(EatClaim::SECURITY_LEVEL,
get_uint32_value(EatSecurityLevel::SECURE_RESTRICTED));
break;
case KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_STRONGBOX:
eat_record.add(EatClaim::SECURITY_LEVEL, get_uint32_value(EatSecurityLevel::HARDWARE));
break;
default:
return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
keymaster_error_t error;
const AttestationContext::VerifiedBootParams* vb_params = context.GetVerifiedBootParams(&error);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
if (vb_params->verified_boot_key.data_length) {
eat_record.add(EatClaim::VERIFIED_BOOT_KEY, blob_to_bstr(vb_params->verified_boot_key));
}
if (vb_params->verified_boot_hash.data_length) {
eat_record.add(EatClaim::VERIFIED_BOOT_HASH, blob_to_bstr(vb_params->verified_boot_hash));
}
if (vb_params->device_locked) {
eat_record.add(EatClaim::DEVICE_LOCKED, vb_params->device_locked);
}
bool verified_or_self_signed = (vb_params->verified_boot_state == KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED ||
vb_params->verified_boot_state == KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED);
auto eat_boot_state = cppbor::Array()
.add(verified_or_self_signed) // secure-boot-enabled
.add(verified_or_self_signed) // debug-disabled
.add(verified_or_self_signed) // debug-disabled-since-boot
.add(verified_or_self_signed) // debug-permanent-disable
.add(false); // debug-full-permanent-disable (no way to verify)
eat_record.add(EatClaim::BOOT_STATE, std::move(eat_boot_state));
eat_record.add(EatClaim::OFFICIAL_BUILD,
vb_params->verified_boot_state == KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED);
eat_record.add(EatClaim::ATTESTATION_VERSION,
version_to_attestation_version(context.GetKmVersion()));
eat_record.add(EatClaim::KEYMASTER_VERSION,
version_to_attestation_km_version(context.GetKmVersion()));
keymaster_blob_t attestation_challenge = {nullptr, 0};
if (!attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, &attestation_challenge)) {
return KM_ERROR_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING;
}
if (!is_valid_attestation_challenge(attestation_challenge)) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
}
eat_record.add(EatClaim::NONCE, blob_to_bstr(attestation_challenge));
keymaster_blob_t attestation_app_id;
if (!attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, &attestation_app_id)) {
return KM_ERROR_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING;
}
// TODO: what should happen when sw_enforced already contains TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID?
// (as is the case in android_keymaster_test.cpp). For now, we will ignore the provided one in
// attestation_params if that's the case.
keymaster_blob_t existing_app_id;
if (!sw_enforced.GetTagValue(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, &existing_app_id)) {
sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, attestation_app_id);
}
error = context.VerifyAndCopyDeviceIds(
attestation_params,
context.GetSecurityLevel() == KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE ? &sw_enforced : &tee_enforced);
if (error == KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED) {
// The KeymasterContext implementation does not support device ID attestation. Bail out if
// device ID attestation is being attempted.
for (const auto& tag : kDeviceAttestationTags) {
if (attestation_params.find(tag) != -1) {
return KM_ERROR_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS;
}
}
} else if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
return error;
}
if (attestation_params.Contains(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION) &&
context.GetSecurityLevel() == KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_STRONGBOX) {
eat_record.add(EatClaim::DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, true);
}
cppbor::Map software_submod;
error = build_eat_submod(sw_enforced, EatSecurityLevel::UNRESTRICTED, &software_submod);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
cppbor::Map tee_submod;
error = build_eat_submod(tee_enforced, EatSecurityLevel::SECURE_RESTRICTED, &tee_submod);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
if (software_submod.size() + tee_submod.size() > 0) {
cppbor::Map submods;
if (software_submod.size() > 0) {
submods.add(kEatSubmodNameSoftware, std::move(software_submod));
}
if (tee_submod.size() > 0) {
submods.add(kEatSubmodNameTee, std::move(tee_submod));
}
eat_record.add(EatClaim::SUBMODS, std::move(submods));
}
if (attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)) {
uint64_t creation_datetime;
// Only check sw_enforced for TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, since it shouldn't be in tee_enforced,
// since this implementation has no secure wall clock.
if (!sw_enforced.GetTagValue(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, &creation_datetime)) {
LOG_E("Unique ID cannot be created without creation datetime", 0);
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
}
Buffer unique_id = context.GenerateUniqueId(
creation_datetime, attestation_app_id,
attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION), &error);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
eat_record.add(EatClaim::CTI,
cppbor::Bstr(std::pair(unique_id.begin(), unique_id.available_read())));
}
*eat_token = eat_record.encode();
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
std::vector<uint8_t> build_unique_id_input(uint64_t creation_date_time,
const keymaster_blob_t& application_id,
bool reset_since_rotation) {
uint64_t rounded_date = creation_date_time / 2592000000LLU;
uint8_t* serialized_date = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&rounded_date);
std::vector<uint8_t> input;
input.insert(input.end(), serialized_date, serialized_date + sizeof(rounded_date));
input.insert(input.end(), application_id.data,
application_id.data + application_id.data_length);
input.push_back(reset_since_rotation ? 1 : 0);
return input;
}
Buffer generate_unique_id(const std::vector<uint8_t>& hbk, uint64_t creation_date_time,
const keymaster_blob_t& application_id, bool reset_since_rotation) {
HmacSha256 hmac;
hmac.Init(hbk.data(), hbk.size());
std::vector<uint8_t> input =
build_unique_id_input(creation_date_time, application_id, reset_since_rotation);
Buffer unique_id(UNIQUE_ID_SIZE);
hmac.Sign(input.data(), input.size(), unique_id.peek_write(), unique_id.available_write());
unique_id.advance_write(UNIQUE_ID_SIZE);
return unique_id;
}
// Construct an ASN1.1 DER-encoded attestation record containing the values from sw_enforced and
// tee_enforced.
keymaster_error_t build_attestation_record(const AuthorizationSet& attestation_params, //
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced,
AuthorizationSet tee_enforced,
const AttestationContext& context,
UniquePtr<uint8_t[]>* asn1_key_desc,
size_t* asn1_key_desc_len) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(asn1_key_desc && asn1_key_desc_len, KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
UniquePtr<KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Delete> key_desc(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_new());
if (!key_desc.get()) return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = nullptr;
if (context.GetSecurityLevel() == KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE) {
key_desc->software_enforced->root_of_trust = KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST_new();
root_of_trust = key_desc->software_enforced->root_of_trust;
} else {
key_desc->tee_enforced->root_of_trust = KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST_new();
root_of_trust = key_desc->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
}
keymaster_error_t error;
auto vb_params = context.GetVerifiedBootParams(&error);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
if (vb_params->verified_boot_key.data_length &&
!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(root_of_trust->verified_boot_key, vb_params->verified_boot_key.data,
vb_params->verified_boot_key.data_length)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
if (vb_params->verified_boot_hash.data_length &&
!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(root_of_trust->verified_boot_hash,
vb_params->verified_boot_hash.data,
vb_params->verified_boot_hash.data_length)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
root_of_trust->device_locked = vb_params->device_locked ? 0xFF : 0x00;
if (!ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(root_of_trust->verified_boot_state, vb_params->verified_boot_state)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(key_desc->attestation_version,
version_to_attestation_version(context.GetKmVersion())) ||
!ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(key_desc->attestation_security_level, context.GetSecurityLevel()) ||
!ASN1_INTEGER_set(key_desc->keymaster_version,
version_to_attestation_km_version(context.GetKmVersion())) ||
!ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(key_desc->keymaster_security_level, context.GetSecurityLevel())) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
keymaster_blob_t attestation_challenge = {nullptr, 0};
if (!attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, &attestation_challenge)) {
return KM_ERROR_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING;
}
if (!is_valid_attestation_challenge(attestation_challenge)) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
}
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(key_desc->attestation_challenge, attestation_challenge.data,
attestation_challenge.data_length)) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
keymaster_blob_t attestation_app_id;
if (!attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, &attestation_app_id)) {
return KM_ERROR_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING;
}
sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, attestation_app_id);
error = context.VerifyAndCopyDeviceIds(
attestation_params,
context.GetSecurityLevel() == KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE ? &sw_enforced : &tee_enforced);
if (error == KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED) {
// The KeymasterContext implementation does not support device ID attestation. Bail out if
// device ID attestation is being attempted.
for (const auto& tag : kDeviceAttestationTags) {
if (attestation_params.find(tag) != -1) {
return KM_ERROR_CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS;
}
}
} else if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
return error;
}
if (attestation_params.Contains(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION) &&
context.GetSecurityLevel() == KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_STRONGBOX) {
tee_enforced.push_back(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
};
error = build_auth_list(sw_enforced, key_desc->software_enforced);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
error = build_auth_list(tee_enforced, key_desc->tee_enforced);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
if (attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)) {
uint64_t creation_datetime;
// Only check sw_enforced for TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, since it shouldn't be in tee_enforced,
// since this implementation has no secure wall clock.
if (!sw_enforced.GetTagValue(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, &creation_datetime)) {
LOG_E("Unique ID cannot be created without creation datetime", 0);
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
}
Buffer unique_id = context.GenerateUniqueId(
creation_datetime, attestation_app_id,
attestation_params.GetTagValue(TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION), &error);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
key_desc->unique_id = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (!key_desc->unique_id ||
!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(key_desc->unique_id, unique_id.peek_read(),
unique_id.available_read()))
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
int len = i2d_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(key_desc.get(), nullptr);
if (len < 0) return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
*asn1_key_desc_len = len;
asn1_key_desc->reset(new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[*asn1_key_desc_len]);
if (!asn1_key_desc->get()) return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
uint8_t* p = asn1_key_desc->get();
len = i2d_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(key_desc.get(), &p);
if (len < 0) return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
// Copy all enumerated values with the specified tag from stack to auth_list.
static bool get_repeated_enums(const ASN1_INTEGER_SET* stack, keymaster_tag_t tag,
AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(keymaster_tag_get_type(tag) == KM_ENUM_REP, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(stack); ++i) {
if (!auth_list->push_back(
keymaster_param_enum(tag, ASN1_INTEGER_get(sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(stack, i)))))
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Add the specified integer tag/value pair to auth_list.
template <keymaster_tag_type_t Type, keymaster_tag_t Tag, typename KeymasterEnum>
static bool get_enum(const ASN1_INTEGER* asn1_int, TypedEnumTag<Type, Tag, KeymasterEnum> tag,
AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
if (!asn1_int) return true;
return auth_list->push_back(tag, static_cast<KeymasterEnum>(ASN1_INTEGER_get(asn1_int)));
}
// Add the specified ulong tag/value pair to auth_list.
static bool get_ulong(const ASN1_INTEGER* asn1_int, keymaster_tag_t tag,
AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
if (!asn1_int) return true;
UniquePtr<BIGNUM, BIGNUM_Delete> bn(ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(asn1_int, nullptr));
if (!bn.get()) return false;
uint64_t ulong = 0;
BN_get_u64(bn.get(), &ulong);
return auth_list->push_back(keymaster_param_long(tag, ulong));
}
// Extract the values from the specified ASN.1 record and place them in auth_list.
keymaster_error_t extract_auth_list(const KM_AUTH_LIST* record, AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
if (!record) return KM_ERROR_OK;
// Purpose
if (!get_repeated_enums(record->purpose, TAG_PURPOSE, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Algorithm
if (!get_enum(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Key size
if (record->key_size &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_KEY_SIZE, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->key_size))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Block mode
if (!get_repeated_enums(record->block_mode, TAG_BLOCK_MODE, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Digest
if (!get_repeated_enums(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Padding
if (!get_repeated_enums(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Caller nonce
if (record->caller_nonce && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Min mac length
if (!get_ulong(record->min_mac_length, TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// EC curve
if (!get_enum(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// RSA public exponent
if (!get_ulong(record->rsa_public_exponent, TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Rsa Oaep Mgf Digest
if (!get_repeated_enums(record->mgf_digest, TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Rollback resistance
if (record->rollback_resistance && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Early boot only
if (record->early_boot_only && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Active date time
if (!get_ulong(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Origination expire date time
if (!get_ulong(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Usage Expire date time
if (!get_ulong(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Usage count limit
if (record->usage_count_limit &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->usage_count_limit))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// No auth required
if (record->no_auth_required && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// User auth type
if (!get_enum(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Auth timeout
if (record->auth_timeout &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->auth_timeout))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Allow while on body
if (record->allow_while_on_body && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// trusted user presence required
if (record->trusted_user_presence_required &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// trusted confirmation required
if (record->trusted_confirmation_required &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Unlocked device required
if (record->unlocked_device_required && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// All applications
if (record->all_applications && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_ALL_APPLICATIONS)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Application ID
if (record->application_id &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, record->application_id->data,
record->application_id->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Creation date time
if (!get_ulong(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Origin
if (!get_enum(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Rollback resistant
if (record->rollback_resistant && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Root of trust
if (record->root_of_trust) {
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* rot = record->root_of_trust;
if (!rot->verified_boot_key) return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
// Other root of trust fields are not mapped to auth set entries.
}
// OS Version
if (record->os_version &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_OS_VERSION, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->os_version))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// OS Patch level
if (record->os_patchlevel &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->os_patchlevel))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// attestation application Id
if (record->attestation_application_id &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
record->attestation_application_id->data,
record->attestation_application_id->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Brand name
if (record->attestation_id_brand &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, record->attestation_id_brand->data,
record->attestation_id_brand->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Device name
if (record->attestation_id_device &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, record->attestation_id_device->data,
record->attestation_id_device->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Product name
if (record->attestation_id_product &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, record->attestation_id_product->data,
record->attestation_id_product->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Serial number
if (record->attestation_id_serial &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, record->attestation_id_serial->data,
record->attestation_id_serial->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// IMEI
if (record->attestation_id_imei &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, record->attestation_id_imei->data,
record->attestation_id_imei->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// MEID
if (record->attestation_id_meid &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, record->attestation_id_meid->data,
record->attestation_id_meid->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Manufacturer name
if (record->attestation_id_manufacturer &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
record->attestation_id_manufacturer->data,
record->attestation_id_manufacturer->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// Model name
if (record->attestation_id_model &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, record->attestation_id_model->data,
record->attestation_id_model->length)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// vendor patch level
if (record->vendor_patchlevel &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->vendor_patchlevel))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// boot patch level
if (record->boot_patch_level &&
!auth_list->push_back(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->boot_patch_level))) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// device unique attestation
if (record->device_unique_attestation && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
// identity credential key
if (record->identity_credential_key && !auth_list->push_back(TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY)) {
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
// Parse the DER-encoded attestation record, placing the results in keymaster_version,
// attestation_challenge, software_enforced, tee_enforced and unique_id.
keymaster_error_t parse_attestation_record(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
uint32_t* attestation_version, //
keymaster_security_level_t* attestation_security_level,
uint32_t* keymaster_version,
keymaster_security_level_t* keymaster_security_level,
keymaster_blob_t* attestation_challenge,
AuthorizationSet* software_enforced,
AuthorizationSet* tee_enforced,
keymaster_blob_t* unique_id) {
const uint8_t* p = asn1_key_desc;
UniquePtr<KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Delete> record(
d2i_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(nullptr, &p, asn1_key_desc_len));
if (!record.get()) return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
*attestation_version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->attestation_version);
*attestation_security_level = static_cast<keymaster_security_level_t>(
ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(record->attestation_security_level));
*keymaster_version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(record->keymaster_version);
*keymaster_security_level = static_cast<keymaster_security_level_t>(
ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(record->keymaster_security_level));
attestation_challenge->data =
dup_buffer(record->attestation_challenge->data, record->attestation_challenge->length);
attestation_challenge->data_length = record->attestation_challenge->length;
unique_id->data = dup_buffer(record->unique_id->data, record->unique_id->length);
unique_id->data_length = record->unique_id->length;
keymaster_error_t error = extract_auth_list(record->software_enforced, software_enforced);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
return extract_auth_list(record->tee_enforced, tee_enforced);
}
keymaster_error_t parse_root_of_trust(const uint8_t* asn1_key_desc, size_t asn1_key_desc_len,
keymaster_blob_t* verified_boot_key,
keymaster_verified_boot_t* verified_boot_state,
bool* device_locked) {
const uint8_t* p = asn1_key_desc;
UniquePtr<KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION, KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION_Delete> record(
d2i_KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION(nullptr, &p, asn1_key_desc_len));
if (!record.get()) {
return TranslateLastOpenSslError();
}
if (!record->tee_enforced) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (!record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust->verified_boot_key) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust = record->tee_enforced->root_of_trust;
verified_boot_key->data = dup_buffer(root_of_trust->verified_boot_key->data,
root_of_trust->verified_boot_key->length);
verified_boot_key->data_length = root_of_trust->verified_boot_key->length;
*verified_boot_state = static_cast<keymaster_verified_boot_t>(
ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(root_of_trust->verified_boot_state));
*device_locked = root_of_trust->device_locked;
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
// Parse the EAT-encoded attestation record, placing the results in keymaster_version,
// attestation_challenge, software_enforced, tee_enforced and unique_id.
keymaster_error_t parse_eat_record(
const uint8_t* eat_key_desc, size_t eat_key_desc_len, uint32_t* attestation_version,
keymaster_security_level_t* attestation_security_level, uint32_t* keymaster_version,
keymaster_security_level_t* keymaster_security_level, keymaster_blob_t* attestation_challenge,
AuthorizationSet* software_enforced, AuthorizationSet* tee_enforced,
keymaster_blob_t* unique_id, keymaster_blob_t* verified_boot_key,
keymaster_verified_boot_t* verified_boot_state, bool* device_locked,
std::vector<int64_t>* unexpected_claims) {
auto [top_level_item, next_pos, error] = cppbor::parse(eat_key_desc, eat_key_desc_len);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(top_level_item, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
const cppbor::Map* eat_map = top_level_item->asMap();
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(eat_map, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
bool verified_or_self_signed = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < eat_map->size(); i++) {
auto& [key_item, value_item] = (*eat_map)[i];
const cppbor::Int* key = key_item->asInt();
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(key, (KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG));
// The following values will either hold the typed value, or be null (if not the right
// type).
const cppbor::Int* int_value = value_item->asInt();
const cppbor::Bstr* bstr_value = value_item->asBstr();
const cppbor::Simple* simple_value = value_item->asSimple();
const cppbor::Array* array_value = value_item->asArray();
const cppbor::Map* map_value = value_item->asMap();
keymaster_error_t error;
switch ((EatClaim)key->value()) {
default:
unexpected_claims->push_back(key->value());
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_VERSION:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(int_value, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
*attestation_version = int_value->value();
break;
case EatClaim::SECURITY_LEVEL:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(int_value, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
switch ((EatSecurityLevel)int_value->value()) {
// TODO: Is my assumption correct that the security level of the attestation data should
// always be equal to the security level of keymint, as the attestation data always
// lives in the top-level module?
case EatSecurityLevel::UNRESTRICTED:
*keymaster_security_level = *attestation_security_level =
KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_SOFTWARE;
break;
case EatSecurityLevel::SECURE_RESTRICTED:
*keymaster_security_level = *attestation_security_level =
KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT;
break;
case EatSecurityLevel::HARDWARE:
*keymaster_security_level = *attestation_security_level =
KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_STRONGBOX;
break;
default:
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
break;
case EatClaim::KEYMASTER_VERSION:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(int_value, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
*keymaster_version = int_value->value();
break;
case EatClaim::SUBMODS:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(map_value, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
for (size_t j = 0; j < map_value->size(); j++) {
auto& [submod_key, submod_value] = (*map_value)[j];
const cppbor::Map* submod_map = submod_value->asMap();
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(submod_map, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
error = parse_eat_submod(submod_map, software_enforced, tee_enforced);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
}
break;
case EatClaim::CTI:
error = bstr_to_blob(bstr_value, unique_id);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
break;
case EatClaim::NONCE:
error = bstr_to_blob(bstr_value, attestation_challenge);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
break;
case EatClaim::VERIFIED_BOOT_KEY:
error = bstr_to_blob(bstr_value, verified_boot_key);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
break;
case EatClaim::VERIFIED_BOOT_HASH:
// Not parsing this for now.
break;
case EatClaim::DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
// Not parsing this for now.
break;
case EatClaim::DEVICE_LOCKED:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(simple_value->asBool(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
*device_locked = simple_value->asBool()->value();
break;
case EatClaim::BOOT_STATE:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(array_value, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(array_value->size() == 5, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR((*array_value)[4]->asSimple()->asBool()->value() == false,
KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
verified_or_self_signed = (*array_value)[0]->asSimple()->asBool()->value();
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(verified_or_self_signed ==
(*array_value)[1]->asSimple()->asBool()->value(),
KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(verified_or_self_signed ==
(*array_value)[2]->asSimple()->asBool()->value(),
KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(verified_or_self_signed ==
(*array_value)[3]->asSimple()->asBool()->value(),
KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
break;
case EatClaim::OFFICIAL_BUILD:
*verified_boot_state = KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED;
break;
}
}
if (*verified_boot_state == KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED) {
(void)(verified_boot_state);
// TODO: re-enable this
// ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(verified_or_self_signed, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
} else {
*verified_boot_state =
verified_or_self_signed ? KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED : KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED;
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t parse_submod_values(AuthorizationSetBuilder* set_builder,
int* auth_set_security_level, const cppbor::Map* submod_map) {
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(set_builder, KM_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_NULL_POINTER);
for (size_t i = 0; i < submod_map->size(); i++) {
auto& [key_item, value_item] = (*submod_map)[i];
const cppbor::Int* key_int = key_item->asInt();
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(key_int, KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
int key = key_int->value();
keymaster_error_t error;
keymaster_blob_t blob;
switch ((EatClaim)key) {
default:
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
case EatClaim::ALGORITHM:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(
TAG_ALGORITHM, static_cast<keymaster_algorithm_t>(value_item->asInt()->value()));
break;
case EatClaim::EC_CURVE:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(
TAG_EC_CURVE, static_cast<keymaster_ec_curve_t>(value_item->asInt()->value()));
break;
case EatClaim::USER_AUTH_TYPE:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, static_cast<hw_authenticator_type_t>(
value_item->asInt()->value()));
break;
case EatClaim::ORIGIN:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(
TAG_ORIGIN, static_cast<keymaster_key_origin_t>(value_item->asInt()->value()));
break;
case EatClaim::PURPOSE:
for (size_t j = 0; j < value_item->asArray()->size(); j++) {
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE,
static_cast<keymaster_purpose_t>(
(*value_item->asArray())[j]->asInt()->value()));
}
break;
case EatClaim::PADDING:
for (size_t j = 0; j < value_item->asArray()->size(); j++) {
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_PADDING,
static_cast<keymaster_padding_t>(
(*value_item->asArray())[j]->asInt()->value()));
}
break;
case EatClaim::DIGEST:
for (size_t j = 0; j < value_item->asArray()->size(); j++) {
set_builder->Authorization(
TAG_DIGEST,
static_cast<keymaster_digest_t>((*value_item->asArray())[j]->asInt()->value()));
}
break;
case EatClaim::BLOCK_MODE:
for (size_t j = 0; j < value_item->asArray()->size(); j++) {
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE,
static_cast<keymaster_block_mode_t>(
(*value_item->asArray())[j]->asInt()->value()));
}
break;
case EatClaim::KEY_SIZE:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::AUTH_TIMEOUT:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::OS_VERSION:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::OS_PATCHLEVEL:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::MIN_MAC_LENGTH:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::ACTIVE_DATETIME:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME,
value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::IAT:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, value_item->asInt()->value());
break;
case EatClaim::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
break;
case EatClaim::ALL_APPLICATIONS:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ALL_APPLICATIONS);
break;
case EatClaim::ROLLBACK_RESISTANT:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT);
break;
case EatClaim::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY);
break;
case EatClaim::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED);
break;
case EatClaim::CALLER_NONCE:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE);
break;
case EatClaim::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED);
break;
case EatClaim::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY);
break;
case EatClaim::IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY);
break;
case EatClaim::STORAGE_KEY:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_STORAGE_KEY);
break;
case EatClaim::TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED);
break;
case EatClaim::DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION:
if (value_item->asSimple() == nullptr || !value_item->asSimple()->asBool()->value()) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
}
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
break;
case EatClaim::APPLICATION_ID:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::UEID:
error = ueid_to_imei_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN:
error = bstr_to_blob(value_item->asBstr(), &blob);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
set_builder->Authorization(TAG_CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, blob);
break;
case EatClaim::SECURITY_LEVEL:
ASSERT_OR_RETURN_ERROR(value_item->asInt(), KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG);
*auth_set_security_level = value_item->asInt()->value();
}
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t parse_eat_submod(const cppbor::Map* submod_values,
AuthorizationSet* software_enforced,
AuthorizationSet* tee_enforced) {
AuthorizationSetBuilder auth_set_builder;
int auth_set_security_level = 0;
keymaster_error_t error =
parse_submod_values(&auth_set_builder, &auth_set_security_level, submod_values);
if (error) return error;
switch ((EatSecurityLevel)auth_set_security_level) {
case EatSecurityLevel::HARDWARE:
// Hardware attestation should never occur in a submod of another EAT.
[[fallthrough]];
default:
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
case EatSecurityLevel::UNRESTRICTED:
*software_enforced = AuthorizationSet(auth_set_builder);
break;
case EatSecurityLevel::SECURE_RESTRICTED:
*tee_enforced = AuthorizationSet(auth_set_builder);
break;
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
} // namespace keymaster
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